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Executive Summary
In March 2007, the European Council decided on a 
new integrated climate and energy policy designed 
to combat climate change, reduce import depend-
ence and increase the competitiveness of the internal 
energy market. Two years later, a set of Directives, 
which are part of the by now well-known “20-20-20 
Package” entailing the reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, increasing renewable energy and decreas-
ing energy consumption through energy efficiency 
measures by 20% by the year 2020, was approved.
In the current context where public budgets are over-
stretched due to the economic crisis, there is a need 
to understand the effect of new climate policies on 
public revenues and expenses. The transition to a 
low-carbon energy system can create new sources of 
public funds (i.e. carbon pricing) but at the same time 
will imply an increase in certain State expenses (e.g. 
support to RD&D). It will also affect existing revenue 
streams such as a reduction in excise taxes from fossil 
fuels, whose size is not negligible in various Member 
States. Besides, climate policies generally impose a 
constraint on production and consumption decisions 
in the economy, which may well create efficiency 
costs. Therefore, a depressing impact on economic 
growth might be expected in the short-term, which 
may overshadow the stimulating effect of the increase 
in innovation subsidies. The net effect of any such 
simultaneous changes on main macroeconomic vari-
ables is, in any case, highly conjectural.
We estimate the impact of new policies targeting 
EU 2020 climate objectives on the fiscal balance of 
Member States in the year 2020. The policies whose 
effect we consider are those whose implementation 
has been decided from the year 2009 onward, i.e. car-
bon taxes applied in non-ETS sectors and additional 
support payments and energy efficiency regulations 
increasing the penetration and development of clean 
technologies. Through back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lations, we determine the effect of the application of 
these policies on public budgets by computing and 
comparing public revenues and expenses under a 
Baseline and an Enhanced Policy package. We inves-
tigate the level of both direct effects of new climate 
policies on public budgets and, in an approximate 
way, indirect effects resulting from changes in the use 
of resources triggered by these policies.
Section 2 briefly introduces the main assumptions on 
which our analysis is based. The social cost of replac-
ing high-carbon products with low-carbon ones is as-
sumed to be equal to the costs incurred by industries 
when abating carbon. Based on this assumption, we 
estimate the isolated impact that changes in the use 
of resources by economic agents will have on national 
GDPs. We do not consider changes made to policies 
other than climate policy ones. Hence, any recycling 
of revenues or the sourcing of expenses resulting from 
climate policies are not taken into account; welfare 
(or distributional) effects are not treated. Given the 
uncertainty about future levels of carbon abatement 
cost, we consider three different possible futures cor-
responding to three different cost levels. Based on 
available information in the literature and making 
use of simplifying assumptions, we derive the level of 
carbon prices to be applied in each future both when 
new climate policies are in place and when they are 
not. 
In Section 3, we discuss both in qualitative and quan-
titative terms how new and more ambitious policies 
can directly impact national public budgets. The di-
rect effects considered include carbon pricing and 
the increase in subsidies to RD&D targeting low-C 
technologies. The first effect clearly dominates the 
second. Net public revenues in the year 2020 directly 
generated by climate policies applied in the Baseline 
scenario range between €52 and 123bn for the EU-27 
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as a whole depending on the carbon abatement cost 
level considered. Net incremental public revenues 
resulting from the application of new policies in an 
Enhanced Policy scenario range from a maximum of 
€71 bn (0.55% of the EU-27 GDP) in the case of high 
abatement costs, down to a negative value of €10 bn 
(-0.06% of GDP) if abatement costs are low. Reach-
ing a given objective in terms of emission reductions 
requires the application of higher carbon prices the 
higher carbon abatement costs are. This would result 
in higher revenues from carbon taxes and from the 
auctioning of ETS allowances, and therefore a more 
positive change in the net public budget given a level 
of innovation subsidies.
Section 4 investigates the indirect impacts that new 
climate policies have on public budgets. First, we cal-
culate the effect that the reduction in fossil fuel pro-
duction and consumption levels will have on revenues 
from excise taxes and subsidies provided to these fu-
els. Second, we estimate changes in public revenues 
and expenses resulting from the effect that new cli-
mate policies have on the level of economic output. 
Both types of effects are relevant, though changes in 
State revenues associated with those in GDP is prob-
ably the main factor in explaining differences among 
countries. Computed net indirect impacts range from 
an overall decrease in net revenues of about 0.03% of 
the EU-27 GDP when considering low carbon abate-
ment costs to a decrease of about 0.23% for high 
abatement costs.
Section 5 provides the aggregate impact of all direct 
and indirect effects of new climate policies on State 
budgets in 2020. For the EU-27 as a whole and giv-
en our assumptions, additional net public revenues 
of about €12.6bn (0.09% of the EU-27 GDP) can be 
expected if abatement costs are at the medium level 
of the considered range. This makes a non-negligible 
impact which is nevertheless much lower than the 
impact of changes in main macroeconomic variables 
over time on public accounts. 
Additional revenues from carbon pricing and the de-
crease in revenues from excise taxes on fossil fuels and 
general taxes are the main factors contributing to the 
overall impact, though differences among countries 
are mainly related to differences in carbon pricing 
revenues. Additional net revenues increase with the 
share of emissions produced in non-ETS sectors and 
decrease with the extra reduction in GHG emissions 
achieved. The size of changes in State revenues (both 
if these changes are positive and if they are negative) 
is positively correlated with the carbon intensity of 
the economy. 
Countries most significantly affected by new climate 
policies are those with higher carbon-intensity and 
lower than the EU average GDP/capita ratios. Im-
pacts in those cases can exceed 1% of their GDP. On 
the other hand, the large economies in the EU are 
marginally affected. We assess the sensitivity of these 
results to assumptions made on the impact of the de-
carbonization of the economy on GDP growth and 
the changes in carbon prices caused by new climate 
policies for different levels of carbon abatement costs. 
The nominal value of results is quite sensitive to these 
assumptions but differences among countries are 
much more robust. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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Introduction 
The transition to a low-carbon energy system will 
impact both sides of a country’s budget, i.e. revenues 
(via e.g. changes in the composition of taxes or tax 
levels) and expenditures (via transfer payments or 
direct investments). In the current context, where 
public budgets are overstretched due to the economic 
crisis, there is a pressing need to understand the im-
plications of climate policies on the fiscal situation. 
Climate policies increasing public revenues could 
help to reduce the State debt, while policies signifi-
cantly increasing public expenses could be difficult to 
implement. 
This report investigates the medium-term, isolated 
impact on public budgets of EU Member States of 
climate and energy policy instruments implemented 
from the year 2009 on. We focus on both the average 
level of the net revenues obtained from new climate 
policies and on the differences among Member States 
in these net revenues. Both depend on national in-
dustry and energy sector structures as well as on the 
level of ambition of national climate policy targets set. 
We aim to determine if climate policies will signifi-
cantly alter the fiscal balance of single countries and 
that of the EU-27 as a whole, and which structural 
variables are mainly driving this impact.
To combat climate change and reduce energy import 
dependence, in March 2007 the European Council 
agreed on climate and energy targets to be met in 
the mid-term (2020), namely a// a reduction of EU 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 20% with 
respect to 1990 levels;1 b// meeting at least 20% of 
EU energy consumption using renewable resources 
(RES); and c// the reduction of EU primary energy 
1  The EU leaders offered to step this emission reduction 
target up to 30% provided that other major emitting countries in 
the developed and developing worlds commit to a global climate 
agreement. Negotiations on such an agreement are ongoing.
use by at least 20% compared with projected levels. 
The “climate and energy package” supporting the 
achievement of these targets came into law in 2009.2 
This package includes both a strengthening of policy 
tools already available in 2009 and the implementa-
tion of new instruments. It mainly stands on three 
pillars: a// a revision and strengthening of the emis-
sions trading system (ETS; Directive 2009/29/EC); 
b// an Effort Sharing Agreement governing GHG 
emissions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS 
(Decision 406/2009/EC); and c// binding national 
targets for renewable energy which collectively will 
raise the average RES share across the EU to 20% by 
2020 with a sub-target of a 10% share in the transport 
sector (Directive 2009/28/EC).
Assessing the impact on State budgets of new energy 
policy instruments facilitating the achievement of the 
above presented targets is clearly a very relevant issue 
both for analytical and policy purposes. This type of 
analysis would be interesting in ordinary times, but 
it is of extreme importance in periods of high debt 
such as these ones. This challenging task appears not 
to have been dealt with before. New policies will di-
rectly impact public budgets by generating new reve-
nue and expenditure flows. A government will obtain 
additional revenues from carbon pricing and face an 
increase in expenditures associated with direct public 
support to research, development, and demonstration 
(RD&D) targeting low-carbon (low-C) technologies. 
In addition, most climate policy instruments will af-
fect the decisions of individual economic agents on 
the use of resources, and therefore the economy at 
2  Whereas there are mandatory targets in place for RES 
and GHG emissions, the 20% target of a decrease in primary en-
ergy use is not yet legally binding. The climate and energy pack-
age does not address energy efficiency and energy savings explic-
itly, even though creating some indirect pressure to reduce energy 
consumption. However, in December 2010, the European Parlia-
ment voted for a binding energy saving target of at least 20% by 
2020. Early in 2011, the EU is expected to publish (after several 
delays) the new Energy Efficiency Action Plan. 
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large, thus indirectly affecting State budgets. Those 
indirect effects are harder to predict, but they include 
changes in State revenues and expenses caused by 
the impact of climate policy on the economic out-
put, both level and sectoral composition, prices and 
inflation, production and consumption, unemploy-
ment and interest rates. Particularly relevant for the 
present purposes appears to be, besides the impact 
via output changes, the change in State revenues from 
excise taxes on fossil fuels and in State expenses on 
subsidies for fossil fuels, resulting from the required 
decrease in the production and consumption of these 
fuels. Figure 1 summarizes all direct and indirect ef-
fects of climate policy on public budgets considered 
in our analysis. 
Figure 1: Summary of direct and indirect impacts of climate policy on public budgets
Direct impacts 
from:
Carbon pricing
Increase in subsidies to low-carbon technologies 
(i.e. RD&D)
Indirect impacts 
from:
Changes in the 
use of resources 
by agents
[no revenue recycling 
considered]
Change in subsidies to fossil fuels
Change in revenues from excise taxes on fossil 
fuels
Change in tax revenues and expenses from 
changes in the GDP
NBI
Source: Own depiction
Quantitatively assessing the consequences of the EU 
climate and energy package for public budgets calls 
for simulating the general equilibrium of the econ-
omy of these States with the help of a sophisticated 
dynamic model. Such a model should allow for a 
sectoral and regional disaggregation together with a 
detailed description of the tax system and of public 
budget items. However, such a tool is quite difficult 
to come by: not even the suite of models (primarily 
PRIMES and GEM-E3) that has generated the sce-
narios for the EU package impact assessment exer-
cises seems to possess those features, at least as far 
as the description and working of the public finance 
side of the economy are concerned. Short of that, and 
given the limited time horizon to carry out the pre-
sent analysis, we have adopted a simpler, more direct, 
approach.
Making use of publicly available data on the future 
equilibrium of the energy sector of Member States, 
we have determined through back-of-the-envelope 
calculations the difference between net State revenues 
in the target year 2020 in two situations: a Baseline 
scenario, which only considers those climate policies 
that were first implemented, and a more ambitious 
Enhanced Policy scenario considering additional, 
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more recent legislation. The analysis presented in EC 
(2009) is the only detailed enough, publicly available 
study simulating the future evolution of the energy 
system in Europe while treating separately all EU-27 
countries. Thus, the policy scenarios considered in 
our analysis need to be those in the aforementioned 
work, where the general equilibrium of the system has 
been computed through simulations of the PRIMES 
and GEM-E3 models.3 
The Baseline scenario mainly includes a strengthened 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and different energy 
efficiency regulations. These policies seem unlikely 
to be able to achieve 2020 climate policy objectives 
alone. The Enhanced Policy scenario, in contrast, 
includes policies already applied in the Baseline sce-
nario plus others whose implementation has been de-
cided after the year 2009 to ensure the achievement of 
the 2020 climate and energy policy objectives. Extra 
policies considered include mainly carbon taxation 
in non-ETS sectors to comply with emission reduc-
tion objectives within the Effort Sharing Directive, 
support to deployment measures aimed at achieving 
objectives within the Renewable Directive, and ad-
ditional energy efficiency regulations. As explained 
below, unless excise taxes on fossil fuels are also in 
place, carbon prices of the level computed in EC 
(2009) seem unlikely to trigger the reduction in the 
consumption of fossil fuels required to meet the 2020 
targets. This together with the lack of information in 
EC (2009) on climate policies applied at the national 
level have led us to assume that carbon prices applied 
in these two scenarios complement instead of replace 
excise taxes on fossil fuels (energy taxes), which have 
3  The level of current taxes and subsidies related to 
climate policy, as published in Pazienza et al. (2011), has been 
used to compute the absolute value of the corresponding State 
revenues and expenses both in 2009 and in 2020. The latter has 
been compared to the incremental impact of new climate poli-
cies on the public budgets of Member States in 2020 to assess the 
relevance of this impact.
been deemed to be of the same level as those current-
ly applied. 
Due to the fact that policy scenarios compared are 
not far one from the other, the resulting differential 
impact of policy on the public accounts is necessar-
ily small. The decision to limit the comparison to the 
Baseline and Enhanced Policy scenarios was due both 
to the mandate for the present report and to the in-
formation available and accessible within the short 
time given. We have understood this mandate as a 
clarification of the possible negative development 
that may affect public accounts in a transition to low-
C technologies. This implies studying the impact of 
new measures which have been or have to be taken 
by Member States as a result of the basic climate pol-
icy decisions made by the Council in 2007 and put 
in practice in the 2009 Directives. When complying 
with this mandate, we relied on existing information 
and specifically on accessible databases and model 
simulations.
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 summa-
rizes the main modeling assumptions based on which 
we conducted this analysis. Section 3 discusses di-
rect impacts of climate policy on State budgets, while 
Section 4 is devoted to indirect impacts. Section 5 
analyzes the overall Net Budget Impact of additional 
climate policies applied in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario. The results of different sensitivity analyses are 
also presented therein. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
1. Central Assumptions 
The simulation exercises presented in EC (2009) as-
sume an evolution of main macroeconomic and de-
mographic variables that is common to both policy 
scenarios explored therein. In other words, authors 
assume that the application of more stringent energy 
policies does not affect these variables. In reality, how-
http://think.eui.eu4
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ever, economic variables such as the GDP are likely to 
be influenced by policies applied, since different poli-
cies should lead to different levels of GHG emission 
reductions, clean technology deployment and energy 
efficiency (see also Annex V). Changes in economic 
output in turn indirectly affect State revenues and 
expenses, as we discuss in more detail in Section 4. 
Therefore, we have made an estimate of the impact 
that differences in the use of resources by economic 
agents between the Baseline and Enhanced Policy 
scenarios shall have on national GDPs. We have par-
tially based this estimate on carbon abatement costs 
to be incurred by Member States in the two policy 
scenarios. Given that there is no information in EC 
(2009) on carbon abatement costs incurred in each 
scenario, we have made our own estimates based on 
carbon prices reported in this study.
Carbon prices considered in EC (2009) are in the low 
range of those projected in the literature. Apart from 
this, the future evolution of variables driving carbon 
abatement costs and carbon prices, namely fossil fuel 
prices and clean technology development rates, is 
highly uncertain. Therefore, besides the carbon prices 
reported in EC (2009) and our estimate of the corre-
sponding carbon abatement costs, we are considering 
two alternative sets of abatement costs correspond-
ing to two alternative possible future situations where 
the cost gap between high and low-C technologies is 
larger than that assumed in EC (2009). 
For each of these two alternative futures we have es-
timated carbon prices in the Baseline and Enhanced 
Policy scenarios assuming that differences in abate-
ment costs among the different futures and scenarios 
considered will lead to the same nominal differences 
in carbon prices. Given that climate policy objectives 
must be met regardless of the level of abatement costs, 
we have assumed that all other energy system vari-
ables are common to all carbon abatement cost fu-
tures. The full analytical framework employed in our 
analysis is given in Annex V.
In order to estimate the future impact of climate poli-
cies on State revenues and expenses, one must first 
make an assumption on which policies will be fi-
nanced from general tax revenues in 2020 (and will 
thus directly affect the public budget) and which will 
be financed through surcharges in consumer tar-
iffs (and will therefore not directly affect the public 
budget). We have assumed that climate policy expen-
ditures will be financed in the same way as they are 
today in most systems (the most common option to-
day is assumed to be adopted by all systems in 2020). 
Thus, we are assuming that support to electricity gen-
eration from RES and investments in clean technol-
ogy related infrastructure is directly or indirectly fi-
nanced through consumer tariffs and is therefore not 
affecting the budget of European countries.4
We aim to compute the isolated impact of climate 
policies on public budgets. Therefore, we do not con-
sider governments’ use of funds obtained from cli-
mate policies, nor do we consider where public funds 
spent on climate policies are obtained from.5 Consid-
4  Support for electricity generation from RES is provid-
ed in almost all MSs and its size is non-negligible. The Council 
of European Energy Regulators estimates that electricity support 
expenditure in 16 MSs (including all the large ones, hence ap-
proximating the total EU-27) reached €13.67 bn in 2009 (CEER, 
2011, table 4), which represents approximately 0.1% of total GDP 
of these countries. Only a small share of such support expendi-
ture is financed via the state budget. The main instruments are: 
(a) pass-through on electricity prices, (b) surcharges on the elec-
tricity transport tariff, (c) public service obligations imposed on 
electricity producers which indirectly impact electricity prices.
The amount of such expenditure is highly variable among MSs 
and changing in time; its variations in the future may then be 
even larger than the overall net impact of new climate policies on 
the public budget of some MSs calculated in our report. The cost 
laid on consumers is not a tax, yet it is a legal obligation which 
may be seen as a substitute for taxes. The loss of competitiveness 
in electricity consuming industries may feed social pressure for 
the burden being moved to the state budget.
5  However, existing legislation includes already different 
requirements. Thus, for example, Directive 2009/29/EC includes 
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ering the recycling of net public revenues would in-
volve redesigning Member States’ fiscal policy, which 
is out of the scope of our analysis. Besides, the over-
all impact on public budgets of changes made to all 
policies (climate and non-climate related) should be 
zero. Net public revenues from any policy must be 
reinvested through other policies somewhere else in 
the economy, while net expenses have to be financed 
through an increase in revenues or debt, or a decrease 
in other public expenses. 
2. Direct Impact of Climate 
Policies on Member States’ Public 
Budgets
Adopting new climate policies involves creating new 
revenue and expense flows for the public sector. This 
section discusses from a qualitative and quantitative 
point of view the direct impact of new, more ambi-
tious, policies supporting the achievement of EU 2020 
climate objectives on the public budget of EU Mem-
ber States. Policies considered are carbon pricing and 
the increase in subsidies to RD&D targeting low-C 
technologies. Changes in subsidies to the deployment 
of low-C technologies and investments in new infra-
structures needed for their integration into the sys-
tem are not taken into account, since we expect that 
they will be (mainly) financed by consumers rather 
than by national governments (maybe with some 
contributions from EU funds in specific projects of 
regional interest; see also CEER, 2011). For each of 
the two policies considered, we first describe its direct 
impact and how we have modeled it and second we 
present and discuss numerical results obtained.
clear provisions for the use of revenues from auctioning GHG 
emission allowances. At least 50% of these should be devoted to 
finance climate policy support payments and subsidies.
2.1  Carbon Pricing
We first provide a summary of existing legislation af-
fecting carbon pricing policies. We then describe the 
modeling carried out; finally, we provide numerical 
results of carbon pricing revenues for both policy sce-
narios in 2020. 
2.1.1 Legislation Affecting Carbon Pricing
An EU-wide cap and trade system was introduced 
in 2003 in order to drive down GHG emissions in 
certain sectors of the economy, namely power gen-
eration and energy-intensive industries. From 2012 
on, emissions in the air transport sector will also be 
subject to this scheme. The mandatory target for the 
reduction of GHG emissions in the EU by 20% in 
2020 with respect to 1990 levels has been split into 
two sub-targets: a reduction of 21% in emissions in 
those sectors covered by the ETS and one of 10% with 
respect to 2005 levels for emissions in the non-ETS 
sectors.6
The 2009 climate and energy policy package strength-
ens legislation on the reduction of emissions and 
extends the coverage of the ETS substantially. The 
new Directive 2009/29/EC considers: i) a longer 
6  The cost-effective solution (i.e. minimization of the 
sum of abatement costs across all sectors) in a first best setting 
would imply a comprehensive ETS covering all emission sourc-
es of the considered economy and establishing a uniform price. 
However, real-world settings call for second best solutions. Mar-
ket failures including e.g. initial tax distortions, market power, 
knowledge spillovers, uncertainty, or high transaction costs might 
provide a strong rational for the partitioning of the emission mar-
ket into ETS and non-ETS. For more details and an evaluation 
of the economic impacts of EU climate policies see Böhringer et 
al. (2009). Rogge and Hoffmann (2010) discuss the impact of the 
ETS as policy instrument on sectoral innovation. For the role of 
fiscal instruments supporting climate policy see e.g. Kosonen and 
Nicodème (2009) or Cansino et al. (2010). Glachant et al. (2010) 
provide an in-depth discussion on challenges for policy making 
originating from the EU energy policy aiming to achieve various 
objectives at the same time, i.e. functioning markets, security of 
supply and sustainability. 
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time horizon (2020 taking explicitly into account the 
longer-term target to keep the increase in the global 
temperature below 2⁰C), ii) a single EU-wide cap on 
emission allowances from 2013 on, iii) the stepwise 
replacement of the free allocation of allowances by 
auctioning, and iv) an enlarged list of activities and 
GHGs covered by the ETS. 
The direct impact of cap-and-trade systems on public 
budgets depends on the maximum amount of allowed 
emissions as well as on the procedure used to allocate 
emission allowances. Decision 2010/634/EU sets the 
total EU-wide amount of allowances at €2,039 mil-
lion for 2013. This cap will decrease by 1.74% per 
year; a review of this factor shall be done in 2020. Full 
auctioning should be the rule from 2013 onwards for 
the electricity sector with free allocation of allowanc-
es to facilities used for district heating/cooling as well 
as to high-efficiency cogeneration used for heating/
cooling. For other ETS sectors than power produc-
tion, a transitional system will be put in place involv-
ing the auctioning of 20% of the allowances in 2013. 
This share will increase linearly resulting in 70% of 
allowances auctioned in 2020. See Box 1 for details 
on the allocation of allowances to Member States and 
Neuhoff et al. (2008) for an in-depth discussion about 
the role of auctioning within the EU-ETS. 
Regarding non-ETS sectors, carbon emission reduc-
tion targets have been centrally set within the Effort 
Sharing Agreement. No decision has been however 
made at the EU level on the regulatory mechanisms 
to be applied to meet the reduction targets. Thus, the 
decision on the climate policy instruments to imple-
ment has been left to Member States, though carbon 
taxes are expected to play a major role. The proposal 
of a new Energy Taxation Directive (EC, 2011b) pro-
vides a framework for the adoption of a tax compris-
ing both an energy component (similar to the excise 
taxes currently applied) and a GHG emissions com-
ponent. Minimum carbon tax levels of €20/t CO2 are 
proposed for several energy products. Apart from 
this, five European countries have already imposed a 
specific tax on the CO2 content of energy products 
(see Table 1). Scandinavian countries introduced this 
special tax in the 1990s on the basis of the Commis-
sion proposal for a common taxation on CO2, which 
has never been approved by the Council. After a long 
debate in 2009, Ireland introduced a new carbon tax 
as a component of a general package of fiscal consoli-
dation. For an in-depth discussion of the composi-
tion of (environmental) taxes in EU Member States 
see Pazienza et al. (2011).
Table 1: Existing carbon taxes in EU Member States
Rate on 
emission
(per t CO2)
Petrol Gas oil Kerosene Heavy fuel GPL Natural gas
Coal and 
coke
Elec-tricity
Denmark
DKK 120 
(€ 17)
x x x x x x x x
Ireland € 15 x x x x x x   
Slovenia € 16  x  x x x x  
Finland € 20 x x x x  x x  
Sweden (*) € 109 x x x x x x   
(*) Standard rate mainly for households and services; lower rates apply to industry.
Source: National Ministries of Finance 
2.1.2 
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2.1.3 Basic Assumptions and Conceptual 
Analysis
Carbon pricing policies assumed to be in place in 
2020 have been chosen taking into account existing 
legislation as well as policy instruments likely to be 
implemented until that time. Concerning ETS sec-
tors, we have considered an EU-wide cap on emis-
sions, full auctioning of allowances in the electricity 
sector and auctioning of 70% of total allowances ded-
icated to non-electricity sectors. Concerning GHG 
emissions originating from non-ETS sectors, we have 
assumed that they will be subject to a uniform carbon 
tax across all Member States and sources of emission. 
We have further assumed that Member States will ob-
tain additional revenues from the VAT applied both 
on the sale of emission allowances and on top of any 
form of carbon tax.7 
7  The treatment of revenues from carbon pricing with 
respect to VAT in the future is not completely clear as to date. 
VAT details are different in different countries and few MSs have 
auctioned allowances so far. The UK started auctioning (and also 
trading between private entities) subject to the standard VAT rate. 
However, after a short period the country decided for a zero-rat-
ed system. This was linked to serious VAT fraud. France recently 
opted for an exemption regime. However, any trading of allow-
ances will be subject to VAT. Therefore, our assumption of apply-
ing VAT to auctioning revenues can be regarded as an appropriate 
approximation of total additional VAT revenues. 
As pointed out above, the literature review we have 
conducted on projections of carbon prices in 2020 
consistent with the achievement of EU climate ob-
jectives suggests that EC estimates of carbon prices 
are on the lower bound of expected price levels (EC, 
2009). Carbon prices typically reported are between 
€20 and €40/t CO2 (see e.g. Broek et al., 2011; Kemp-
fert and Truong, 2007; CCC, 2008; Gorina, 2009). 
Also EC (2011b) proposes carbon taxes for selected 
energy products at a level of €20/t of CO2. Given this 
evidence and the fact that the future evolution of sev-
eral factors conditioning carbon abatement costs are 
highly uncertain, we have considered in our analysis, 
together with carbon prices in EC (2009) and our es-
timate of the corresponding carbon abatement costs, 
two alternative sets of carbon abatement costs corre-
sponding to two alternative possible future situations 
where the cost gap between high- and low-C technol-
ogies is larger than that assumed in EC (2009). 
Reaching a pre-determined level of emissions re-
quires applying higher carbon prices, both in the ETS 
and non-ETS sectors, the higher abatement costs are. 
Therefore, we have assumed that abatement costs are 
positively correlated with carbon prices. On this ba-
sis, nominal differences in carbon abatement costs 
Box 1: Allocation of allowances
In the third allocation period National Allocation 
Plans are not needed anymore; Article 10 of Directive 
2009/29/EC provides detailed guidelines on the auc-
tioning of allowances from 2013 on. Member States 
are responsible for the auctioning of the allowances 
that are allocated to them. In particular:
– 88% of the allowances to be auctioned are to be dis-
tributed among Member States according to their 
historical emissions under the EU ETS, i.e. according 
to their shares within the “verified emissions under 
the Community scheme for 2005, or the average of 
the period from 2005 to 2007, whichever one is the 
highest”;
– The remaining 12% are to be distributed accord-
ing to the economic strength of countries and their 
achievements under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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among the futures considered for them have been 
deemed to translate into the same nominal differ-
ences in carbon prices. Differences in carbon prices 
between the two policy scenarios in each future have 
been deemed common to all futures considered.8 Ta-
ble 2 presents the levels of carbon prices considered 
in each future and scenario.
Computations have been carried out considering a 
uniform carbon price for all emissions charged. In 
the Enhanced Policy scenario, this price reflects the 
weighted average of the carbon prices applied in ETS 
and non-ETS sectors. In the Baseline, this corresponds 
to the allowance price applied in the emission trading 
scheme. State revenues from carbon pricing in each 
scenario have been computed as the volume of emis-
sions charged (which also depends on the scenario) 
times the corresponding uniform carbon price. For 
each of the carbon abatement cost futures considered, 
the direct impact of new policies on carbon pricing 
revenues in 2020 has been computed as the difference 
between carbon pricing revenues in the correspond-
ing Enhanced Policy- and Baseline scenarios.
Calculations have been conducted for both the EU-27 
8  This implies that the proportion of the average carbon 
price between the Enhanced Policy scenario and the Baseline 
changes. 
as a whole and every single Member State. Revenues 
comprise auction revenues, where we distinguish be-
tween electricity and non-electricity sectors, carbon 
taxes and VAT. 
2.1.4 Numerical Results
Total carbon pricing revenues for the EU-27 as a 
whole range between about €50bn (representing 
0.35% of the overall GDP) when considering low car-
bon abatement costs and €200bn (representing 1.4% 
of the GDP) for high abatement costs (see Figure 2) 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario. Table 3 provides, for 
the EU as a whole and for each Member State, nomi-
nal values of carbon pricing revenues in the Baseline 
scenario and revenues in the Enhanced Policy scenar-
io additional to those in the Baseline for the different 
carbon abatement cost futures. The latter is expressed 
both in monetary terms and as a percentage of GDP. 
A graphical representation of these results is provided 
in Annex III, Figure 5.
Direct public revenues from carbon pricing dif-
fer substantially across the carbon abatement cost 
futures. The higher carbon abatement costs are, the 
larger and more positive the difference between rev-
enues in the Enhanced Policy and Baseline scenarios 
is. For low abatement costs, additional revenues in the 
Table 2: Assumptions on carbon price levels for the different scenarios
Baseline Enhanced Policy
Input data on 2020 carbon emissions and projected GDP from EC (2009)
Low carbon abatement cost
ETS auction price of €25/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sectors
Uniform price of €10/t CO
2
 - weighted average 
of prices published in EC (2009) -for ETS (€16.5/t 
CO
2
) and non-ETS sectors (€5.3/t CO
2
)
Medium carbon abatement cost
ETS auction price of €40/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sectors
Uniform price (weighted average of prices in 
ETS and non-ETS sectors) of €25/t CO
2
High carbon abatement cost
ETS auction price of €55/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sector
Uniform price (weighted average of prices in 
ETS and non-ETS sectors) of €40/t CO
2
Source: EC (2009) for low carbon abatement costs; own assumptions for medium and high abatement costs
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Enhanced Policy scenario from carbon taxes applied 
in non-ETS sectors cannot outweigh foregone ETS 
auction revenues resulting from the fact that GHG 
emission levels and prices applied are lower than in 
the Baseline. The base of emissions on which carbon 
prices are applied is lower in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario because emission reductions achieved are larg-
er. Additionally, more ambitious regulations in this 
scenario targeting both the deployment of clean gen-
eration and an increase in energy efficiency lead to a 
lower carbon price for the ETS sector. All this taken 
together results in revenues in the low carbon abate-
ment cost future being lower in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario than in the Baseline for most EU countries. It 
should, however, be noted that nominal carbon pric-
ing revenues in both scenarios are significant (€57bn 
in the Baseline and €49bn in the Enhanced policy for 
the EU-27). 
Given that the difference between uniform carbon 
prices in both policy scenarios has been assumed to 
be the same for the three abatement cost futures, the 
ratio of carbon prices in the Enhanced Policy scenar-
io to that in the Baseline rises with the cost of abating 
carbon. As a consequence, extra revenues from car-
bon pricing in the Enhanced Policy scenario become 
positive in most cases for medium abatement costs 
and are substantial for high abatement costs. 
The impact of carbon pricing on State revenues 
also differs across Member States. The main factors 
behind differences among countries are the share of 
carbon emissions in non-ETS sectors, the extra re-
duction in emissions achieved in the Enhance Policy 
scenario, and the carbon intensity of the economy. 
Given that non-ETS emissions only pay a charge in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario, the larger the share of 
these emissions is in a country, the larger the public 
revenues from carbon pricing are in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario relative to the Baseline. Hence, those 
countries with a high relative level of non-ETS emis-
sions (e.g. Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Lat-
via) show high additional revenues in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario under medium and high abatement 
costs. The opposite is true for countries like Bulgaria 
and Estonia featuring a share of ETS emissions in 
2020 of more than 60% – a value significantly above 
the EU average of 46%. It is worth noting that 8 of the 
12 new Member States exhibit higher than the EU-27 
average shares of GHG emissions covered by the ETS. 
Another factor affecting differences among Member 
States is the reduction of GHG emissions taking place 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to the 
Baseline. The larger this difference the lower the ex-
tra revenues in the Enhanced Policy scenario will be. 
Estonia and Finland, for example, show differences 
Figure 2: Revenues from carbon pricing for the EU-27 in 2020 [bn € and % GDP]
% GDP
0.40
0.35
0.64
0.87
0.88
1.40
0 50 100 150 200
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VAT
Source: Own calculation
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in emissions clearly above the EU-27 average and are 
among the countries where revenues in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario compared to those in the Baseline 
are lowest. The opposite is true for e.g. Luxembourg, 
Hungary, or Latvia. 
Finally, one can observe that revenues from carbon 
pricing increase with the carbon intensity of the econ-
omy, since these revenues are larger the larger emis-
sions paying a charge are. However, revenues in the 
Baseline may be larger or smaller than those in the 
Enhanced policy scenario. Therefore, higher carbon 
intensity levels are associated with larger absolute 
values of the difference between revenues in both 
scenarios, but this difference may be positive or nega-
tive. Most of the countries whose public revenues are 
significantly altered by the application of new carbon 
pricing policies have carbon-intensive economies. 
Table 3: Direct impact of carbon pricing on State revenues in 2020
 Revenues Baseline Difference Enhanced Policy scenario - Baseline
 M€ M€ (% of GDP)
Carbon abatement 
cost
Me-
dium
Low High Medium Low High
EU-27 90,841 56,776 124,907 32,910 0.23 -7,275 -0.05 73,096 0.52
Austria 1,323 832 1,819 1,049 0.34 123 0.04 1,977 0.64
Belgium 2,152 1,345 2,959 1,167 0.30 -17 0.00 2,352 0.60
Bulgaria 1,794 1,121 2,467 -110 -0.32 -448 -1.29 228 0.66
Cyprus 189 118 259 62 0.28 -17 -0.08 142 0.63
Czech R. 3,174 1,984 4,364 537 0.35 -499 -0.32 1,574 1.02
Denmark 1,042 651 1,433 513 0.21 -29 -0.01 1,056 0.43
Estonia 633 396 871 -117 -0.76 -189 -1.23 -44 -0.29
Finland 1,549 968 2,130 117 0.06 -302 -0.15 536 0.27
France 4,469 2,793 6,145 7,843 0.37 2,132 0.10 13,554 0.63
Germany 20,468 12,793 28,144 2,865 0.11 -3,459 -0.13 9,189 0.34
Greece 2,844 1,777 3,910 327 0.11 -509 -0.18 1,163 0.40
Hungary 1,142 714 1,570 919 0.80 111 0.10 1,727 1.50
Ireland 983 614 1,351 926 0.42 149 0.07 1,703 0.77
Italy 9,704 6,065 13,343 4,012 0.24 -579 -0.03 8,602 0.51
Latvia 134 83 184 224 1.29 60 0.34 389 2.24
Lithuania 399 249 548 186 0.61 -15 -0.05 387 1.28
Luxemb. 170 106 233 227 0.48 52 0.11 401 0.85
Malta 64 40 88 4 0.05 -13 -0.19 20 0.29
Netherl. 3,938 2,462 5,415 1,306 0.21 -364 -0.06 2,975 0.47
Poland 10,205 6,378 14,031 745 0.18 -1,998 -0.49 3,488 0.86
Portugal 1,243 777 1,710 588 0.33 -45 -0.02 1,220 0.68
Romania 2,651 1,657 3,646 961 0.71 -212 -0.16 2,135 1.58
Slovak R. 1,152 720 1,585 133 0.18 -206 -0.28 472 0.64
Slovenia 497 311 684 153 0.35 -51 -0.12 356 0.81
Spain 7,713 4,821 10,605 3,621 0.28 -287 -0.02 7,529 0.59
Sweden 793 496 1,090 790 0.21 138 0.04 1,443 0.38
UK 10,408 6,505 14,311 3,855 0.16 -800 -0.03 8,510 0.36
Source: Own calculation
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Some of them, like Estonia, experience a large de-
crease in their public revenues, while those of oth-
ers like Hungary are significantly increasing. Finally, 
there are some carbon-intensive economies like Po-
land or Romania where public revenues may increase 
or decrease substantially depending on the level of 
carbon abatement costs considered. 
2.2 Public Support to Clean 
Technology RD&D
Substantial additional RD&D activities are required 
in order to achieve the ambitious target of limiting 
global warming to a maximum of 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. An adequate portfolio of existing 
and new clean energy technologies will not develop 
spontaneously. Reasons for this are as follows: i) the 
current EU ETS does not provide a sufficiently high, 
credible and predictable future carbon price trajecto-
ry, ii) it is unlikely, and probably also undesirable, that 
innovators capture a large fraction of market benefits 
from innovation activities targeting clean technolo-
gies; and iii) there is high uncertainty about future 
market revenues from the exploitation of new clean 
technologies. Thus, there is a need for direct public 
support for innovation.
Developing new clean technologies requires both sup-
porting their development in the earlier stages of the 
innovation chain and their deployment afterwards. 
Deployment subsidies in most EU countries are cur-
rently financed through energy tariffs paid by consum-
ers, i.e. they are support payments not to be catego-
rized as subsidies in their classical definition. They do 
not directly affect public budgets, while their indirect 
effect on public revenues and expenses through their 
impact on decisions by consumers is difficult to esti-
mate. Therefore, deployment subsidies are not consid-
ered in our analysis. Annex II provides a discussion of 
subsidies to the deployment of clean technologies.
There are three main types of policy instruments that 
can directly mobilize public funds to support early 
clean innovation (i.e. the development of immature 
clean technologies): public loans/guarantees, public 
equity, and subsidies. The direct impact of these in-
struments on public budgets is related to the amount 
of public funds mobilized and whether these must 
be reimbursed. Public costs are therefore highest for 
subsidies and lowest for loans, which are most prob-
ably paid back by innovators together with the agreed 
interest rate. Public equity investments offer the State 
the opportunity to earn substantial revenues if the in-
novation company is successful in the market. For an 
in-depth discussion on the optimal choice of financ-
ing instruments to support low-C RD&D see New-
bery et al. (2011). 
2.2.1 Basic Assumptions and Conceptual 
Analysis
Clean technologies to be supported can be classified 
into two main groups: supply side technologies and 
those increasing the efficiency in the use of energy. 
Both will be discussed jointly. However, it has to be 
noted that many energy efficiency measures are al-
ready cost competitive and, therefore, do not need 
direct financial support but instead the removal of 
existing barriers to their application (see also EC, 
2006a; Stern, 2006; Parry et al., 2010).
We have estimated the direct impact on public budg-
ets of the increase in direct public support to clean 
energy innovation that should take place in the En-
hanced Policy scenario with respect to the Baseline 
as the difference between the non-refundable clean 
RD&D investments by Member States in the two sce-
narios. Public national RD&D investments in each 
scenario have been estimated according to the level of 
ambition of technology development objectives that 
we have assumed for this scenario. Innovation policy 
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in the Baseline has been deemed not to be focused 
on the achievement of short- and long-term climate 
policy objectives, while the support to the develop-
ment of clean technologies in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario should be conducive to the achievement of 
2050 objectives (see also Jones and Glachant, 2010).
According to most recent estimates (see Eurostat, 
2010), public contributions to clean RD&D by large 
countries (the main EU contributors) can be consid-
ered proportional to their GDP. Therefore, we have 
assumed that each country will contribute an amount 
of innovation subsidies that is proportional to its eco-
nomic size.
Both fossil fuel prices and the rate of development of 
clean technologies should probably influence the lev-
el of innovation subsidies to be provided. However, 
the overall amount of innovation subsidies has been 
assumed to be common to all carbon abatement cost 
futures. Determining the relationship between subsi-
dies and factors driving carbon abatement costs was 
not possible in the context of our study. Besides, dif-
ferences among innovation subsidies for the different 
carbon abatement cost futures should, in any case, be 
much lower than differences among other public rev-
enues and expense streams.
2.2.2 Numerical Results
As already explained, we have assumed that RD&D 
investments in the Enhanced Policy scenario should 
not only lead to the achievement of 2020 objectives but 
should also pave the way for the achievement of long-
term 2050 objectives.9 Therefore, clean innovation 
investments in the Enhanced Policy scenario should 
9  The level of investments in clean innovation that would 
be needed to achieve only the shorter-term objectives would be 
substantially lower; technologies strictly required to meet 2020 
targets are to a large extent already in the market.
be in line with SET plan needs for the time period 
up to 2020. Total funds devoted annually to RD&D 
addressing SET plan technologies were €3.33bn in 
2007, of which €1.105bn were public funds provided 
by Member States (EC, 2009d). The level of funds de-
voted to low-C technologies should triple during the 
next years if priority actions, as identified within the 
different Industrial Initiatives of the SET plan, are to 
be realized. The overall amount of funds that should 
be invested in the development of SET plan technolo-
gies over the coming decade (2010-2020) has been es-
timated at a level of about €74bn (EC, 2009d). Hence, 
total annual funds needed amount to about €10bn. 
If the fraction of public funds remained at current 
levels, Member States’ governments should spend 
€3.3bn annually. However, most probably the relative 
size of private contributions will decrease. Therefore, 
public innovation funds provided by governments 
will probably have to amount to at least €5bn per year. 
Innovation policy applied in the Baseline scenario 
is expected to be less ambitious than that in the En-
hanced Policy scenario, since long-term global policy 
objectives are deemed not to be achieved in the for-
mer. Hence, public expenditures on low-C RD&D 
in the Baseline scenario should be between those in 
the period 2007-2009 and those projected in the En-
hanced Policy scenario for 2020 (i.e. between €1bn 
and €5bn per year). Thus, the difference between pub-
lic national RD&D investments in the two scenarios 
should be between zero and €4bn. We have taken the 
average of these two extreme values, i.e. €2bn (equal-
ing 0.014% of the 2020 EU-27 GDP), to carry out our 
computations.
We have assumed that incremental innovation sub-
sidies represent the same fraction of the GDP in all 
countries. Thus, most important contributors turn out 
to be those countries with the highest GDP in 2020, 
namely Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain. 
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Table 4 provides innovation subsidies by each coun-
try in the year 2020 in the Baseline scenario and extra 
subsidies to be provided in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario. Results are expressed in monetary units. Pub-
lic costs associated with the increase in innovation 
subsidies in the EU-27 are non-negligible but modest 
compared to other revenue and expense streams, like 
public funds resulting from carbon pricing. This to-
gether with our assumption that contributions from 
countries are in proportion to their economic size 
results in innovation expenses not changing signifi-
cantly the budget balance of any country.
Table 4: Increase in subsidies to clean technology RD&D in 2020
GDP in 2020 RD&D subsidies Baseline
Difference Enhanced  
Policy scenario - Baseline
[bn€] [M€] [M€]
EU-27 14,164.0 3,000.0 2,000.0
Austria 310.4 65.7 43.8
Belgium 389.5 82.5 55.0
Bulgaria 34.7 7.3 4.9
Cyprus 22.5 4.8 3.2
Czech Republic 154.2 32.7 21.8
Denmark 245.9 52.1 34.7
Estonia 15.4 3.3 2.2
Finland 201.4 42.7 28.4
France 2,144.4 454.2 302.8
Germany 2,723.6 576.9 384.6
Greece 290.6 61.6 41.0
Hungary 114.8 24.3 16.2
Ireland 221.7 47.0 31.3
Italy 1,678.7 355.6 237.0
Latvia 17.4 3.7 2.5
Lithuania 30.3 6.4 4.3
Luxembourg 47.3 10.0 6.7
Malta 6.8 1.4 1.0
Netherlands 637.9 135.1 90.1
Poland 406.1 86.0 57.3
Portugal 179.6 38.0 25.4
Romania 135.0 28.6 19.1
Slovak Republic 73.3 15.5 10.4
Slovenia 44.0 9.3 6.2
Spain 1,285.2 272.2 181.5
Sweden 380.3 80.5 53.7
UK 2,373.0 502.6 335.1
Source: EC (2009) for GDP in 2020; remaining numbers own calculation
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2.3 Overall Direct Impact of New 
Policies on Public Budgets
Revenues from carbon pricing are much larger than 
the remaining direct revenues and expenses of Mem-
ber States related to climate policy. Thus, changes in 
carbon pricing revenues in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario with respect to the Baseline represent also the 
major part of the direct impact of new climate policies 
on public budgets. Net direct revenues from climate 
policy are expected to increase with the level of car-
bon abatement costs. Net revenues computed for the 
Baseline scenario and the year 2020 range between 
€52 and €123bn for the EU-27 as a whole. According 
to the assumptions made, net incremental revenues 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario are also expected 
to increase with the level of carbon abatement costs 
from -€10bn at the EU level for low costs (-0.06% of 
GDP) to +€71bn for high costs (0.55% of GDP). Pub-
lic budgets in those countries with a higher carbon 
intensive economy are expected to be more affected 
than budgets in those where carbon emissions are rel-
atively lower. Direct net public revenues are expected 
to increase with the application of new climate poli-
cies in those countries with high shares of emissions 
coming from non-ETS sectors and where additional 
emission reductions required to comply with policy 
objectives are not very significant.
We have focused on major direct impacts of climate 
policies on public revenues and expenses. Not all pos-
sible effects have been considered. Some major costs 
associated with climate policy, like those of infra-
structure investments or clean deployment subsidies, 
are expected to be directly paid by energy consumers. 
Other State revenues and expenses, like direct gov-
ernment investments into green products/services 
via, for example, public procurement programs or 
support policies targeting industries suffering from 
the turn to a green economy are expected to be of 
a minor size. Others like the cancellation of the re-
duced VAT currently applied on energy products are 
quite uncertain, at least in the 2020 horizon.
Table 14 below provides EU-27 and national figures 
for each of the individual effects of policies on pub-
lic budgets, including direct ones, assuming medium 
carbon abatement costs. Results therein are expressed 
as a percentage of the GDP of the corresponding 
economy.
3. Indirect Impact of Climate 
Policies on Member States’ Public 
Budgets 
Besides creating new public revenue and expense 
streams, climate policies also affect the decisions of 
economic agents on the use of resources. Therefore, 
these policies also indirectly affect the public budg-
ets of Member States. Assessing indirect impacts in 
a comprehensive way requires using complex general 
equilibrium models that consider the interdependen-
cies that exist at a global level between the different 
activities in the economy. We have not used such a 
model in our analysis, but instead have computed 
the indirect effect of climate policies on the public 
budget by means of simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culations. Therefore, we have focused on a few main 
indirect effects. 
The effects considered are of two main types. First, 
we assess in Section 4.1 the effect that the reduction 
in the level of fossil fuel production and consumption 
triggered by climate policy has on public revenues 
generated by excise taxes charged on these products 
and public expenses due to on-/off-budget subsidies 
granted to them. We then estimate those changes in 
public revenues and expenses resulting from the ef-
fect that climate policies have on the overall econom-
ic output. Changes in the level of the GDP driven by 
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climate policies are discussed in Section 4.2, while the 
relationship between those and the public budgets is 
assessed in Section 4.3. 
Climate policy effects not considered include changes 
to tax revenues resulting from the partial substitution 
of revenues from general (not excise) taxes applied 
on fossil fuel expenses by revenues from taxes applied 
on investments in cleaner and energy efficient equip-
ment and the associated infrastructure. Note that 
excise taxes are explicitly considered in our analysis. 
We do not discuss either the effect that the expected 
increase in the labor intensity of the economy result-
ing from the partial replacement of high-C industries 
with low-C ones will have on unemployment levels 
and related transfer payments. 
3.1 Changes in State Revenues and 
Expenses related to the Production and 
Consumption of Fossil Fuels
In this section, we discuss the effect that a reduction 
in the production and consumption of fossil fuels 
caused by new climate policies is expected to have on 
public budgets. First, we consider the impact of new 
climate policies on direct subsidies granted to fossil 
fuels; second, we analyze the impact of these policies 
on revenues from excise taxes.
3.1.1 Common Assumptions
As already pointed out in Section 2, the evolution of 
the use of fossil fuels has been assumed to be the same 
for the three different levels of carbon abatement 
costs we have considered. In reality, changes to fossil 
fuel prices and technology development rates affect 
the use of different fossil fuels. However, quantita-
tive values of the variables characterizing the market 
equilibria of the different national systems in the two 
considered policy scenarios, including disaggregated 
fossil fuel production and consumption levels, have 
only been computed in the literature for low carbon 
abatement costs, see EC (2009). Therefore, we had to 
assume that fossil fuel production and consumption 
quantities reported in EC (2009) for the Enhanced 
Policy and Baseline scenarios are also representative 
of market equilibria when carbon abatement costs are 
higher than those assumed by the European Com-
mission. 
3.1.2 Subsidies to Fossil Fuels
Introduction and common assumptions made 
Reducing GHG emissions entails a reduction in the 
production and use of fossil fuels. This may be in-
duced by a decrease, or the abolition of subsidies to 
those products. This would represent a direct effect of 
climate policy on public budgets. However, we have 
adopted a more conservative approach assuming in-
stead that per-unit subsidies will remain unchanged. 
Despite the fact that the size of subsidies for high-C 
products and technologies is not negligible in some 
Member States, their cancellation is a politically sensi-
tive issue. Therefore, in this section we only consider 
those changes to public revenues and expenses that are 
related to climate policy driven changes in the level of 
use and production of fossil fuels. These represent an 
indirect effect of climate policies on public budgets.
Publicly available information on the level of sub-
sidies currently paid by individual Member States 
is very scarce. Thus, we have allocated the global 
amount of on- and, non-hidden off-budget subsidies 
currently provided in the EU to individual countries 
proportionally to some specific subsidies paid by 
these countries. Then, we have extrapolated figures 
so obtained for the year 2020 based on the expected 
evolution of fossil fuel production and consumption 
in the Baseline and Enhanced Policy scenarios (data 
from EC, 2009). 
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Subsidies provided to high-C sectors are typically 
classified into on-budget and off-budget subsidies.10 
We discuss changes in each of these two types of sub-
sidies separately.
On-budget subsidies for fossil fuels
Basic assumptions and conceptual analysis
Our analysis takes as input data the level of overall 
EU subsidies reported in EEA (2004). EU-15 on-
budget subsidies to fossil fuels amounted to €6.6bn 
in 2001 (with €6.4bn provided to solids and €0.2bn to 
oil and gas). We have also taken as input data infor-
mation in the GTAP 7.1 database on the net value of 
output subsidies within the EU in 2004 disaggregated 
by fossil fuel and Member State. However, separating 
output subsidies from energy taxes within the GTAP 
database is not possible strictly speaking.
Based on data published by Eurostat and EC (2009), 
we have estimated implicit excise tax rates applied in 
the year 2008 as the ratio of total revenues in each 
country from energy taxes applied on each fuel in 
that year to the level of gross consumption of this 
fuel. Table 5 shows that taxes paid on oil and gas are 
much larger than those paid by coal. Besides, both the 
GTAP Database and EEA (2004) show that net output 
subsidies received by coal are much larger than those 
received by other fossil fuels. Therefore, we have as-
sumed that only coal output subsidies are relevant 
and that these are largely proportional to net output 
subsidies in the GTAP Database. Output subsidies re-
ceived by other fuels have been deemed zero. Then, 
we have allocated overall fossil fuel on-budget subsi-
dies granted in 2001 to individual countries propor-
tionately to national figures on net coal output subsi-
dies in 2004, while on-budget subsidies received by 
other fuels have been assumed to be zero. 
10  For a more detailed overview on the relevance of sub-
sidies in the energy sector see Pazienza et al. (2011).
We have divided the overall amount of on-budget sub-
sidies to each fuel within each country in 2001 by the 
local level of production of this fuel in the same year 
to compute the level of local per-unit, on-budget sub-
sidies to this fuel. Assuming that this value remains 
constant over time, we have computed the overall 
amount of on-budget subsidies to this fuel expected 
to be paid by each individual country in 2020 in the 
Baseline and Enhanced Policy scenarios by multiply-
ing the corresponding level of national per-unit-sub-
sidies with the projected levels of local production of 
this fuel. Production data for the year 2020 have been 
obtained from EC (2009).11 Finally, the impact of new 
climate policies implemented in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario on on-budget subsidies to fossil fuels has 
been calculated as the difference between on-budget 
subsidies computed for the two scenarios. 
11  In order to take into account the fact that some coun-
tries have stopped producing coal since 2004 while EC (2009) still 
predicts a non-zero level of production in them in the year 2020, 
we have cross-checked the levels of coal production in EC (2009) 
with carbon production figures by country in the year 2009 from 
IEA (2010). If the latter reports that no coal production took 
place in a country in 2009, the projected level of production in 
the year 2020 for this country has been set to zero regardless of 
the corresponding value in EC (2009).
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Table 5: Implicit tax rates on main fossil fuels
[M€/1000 toe] Coal and coke Mineral oils Natural gas
Belgium 0.007 0.16 0.003
Bulgaria 0.001 0.21 -
Czech R. 0.003 0.31 0.005
Denmark 0.049 0.32 0.125
Germany 0.000 0.31 0.027
Estonia 0.000 0.27 0.008
Ireland - 0.26 -
Greece 0.003 0.17 -
Spain - 0.18 -
France 0.001 0.27 0.006
Italy 0.003 0.29 0.035
Cyprus - 0.10
Latvia 0.006 0.27 -
Lithuania 0.006 0.16 -
Luxembourg - 0.31 0.004
Hungary - 0.28 0.008
Malta 0.09
Netherlands 0.002 0.21 0.076
Austria** - 0.29 0.044
Poland - 0.26 -
Portugal - 0.20 0.000
Romania 0.001 0.18 0.003
Slovenia 0.000 0.28 0.004
Slovak R. 0.000 0.26 0.001
Finland 0.016 0.24 0.022
Sweden 0.012 0.33 0.087
UK - 0.34 0.007
** Gas figure in Austria includes coal and electricity 
Source: Computation based on EC and Eurostat data. These implicit tax rates are a rough approximation of energy related tax policy of Member States.
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Numerical results
Numerical results on the level of on-budget subsidies 
provided in the Baseline scenario in each country, as 
well as on the increase in these subsidies in the En-
hanced Policy scenario with respect to the Baseline, 
are shown in Table 6. Figures for the Baseline are pro-
vided in monetary units, while incremental ones are 
provided both in monetary units and as a percentage 
of the respective country’s GDP. Countries not listed 
are deemed not to pay any on-budget subsidies to 
fossil fuels, either because local production of coal, 
which is the only fossil fuel heavily subsidized, is neg-
ligible (or zero) in 2020 or because fossil fuels are not 
subsidized (IEA, 2010). Given that these numbers 
correspond to State expenses, negative values in the 
“Impacts on the public budget” column indicate a 
decrease in State expenses, i.e. an increase in net rev-
enues.
Numerical results obtained mainly depend on unit 
subsidies computed for each country and on the ex-
pected evolution of its coal production. Germany is 
the country paying the highest subsidies to the coal 
industry both in absolute terms and in per unit of 
production. In addition, according to EC (2009) its 
production of coal is projected to be higher in the En-
hanced Policy scenario than in the Baseline in 2020. 
Thus, the amount of subsidies paid within this coun-
try is expected to increase by €90M with the imple-
mentation of tighter climate policy. Significant subsi-
dies are also paid in Spain, Poland and the UK. These 
countries show a small decrease in coal production in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario compared to the Base-
line. Therefore, a small decrease is also expected in 
the overall level of subsidies paid in them. The public 
budget impact of new climate policies for the EU-27 
is positive (representing an increase in on-budget 
subsidies) but negligible relative to GDP (0.0006%). 
The removal of subsidies to fossil fuels within the EU 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario would have a much 
larger impact on public budgets than that computed 
here. In this case, the reduction in public expenses 
would equal the amount of subsidies paid in the Base-
line scenario in 2020, i.e. €3.35bn at the EU level, or 
0.024% of the EU-27 GDP. 
Off-budget subsidies 
Basic assumptions and conceptual analysis
As explained in detail in Annex V, “non-hidden”, off-
budget subsidies are deemed to directly affect net rev-
enues, since, to a large extent, they involve a change 
in taxes levied on some products (a reduction in VAT 
applied, for example). Therefore, off-budget subsidies 
result, in many cases, in a reduction of tax revenues. 
The so-called “hidden” subsidies are not subsidies 
Table 6: Changes in fossil fuel on-budget subsidies 
On-budget subsidies [M€] Impact on public budget in 2020(Enhanced Policy - Baseline scenario)
Baseline (2009) Baseline (2020) [M€] [% of GDP]
EU-27 4,570 3,349 87 0.00060%
Bulgaria 0.44 0.45 -0.08 -0.00024%
Czech Republic 0.82 0.75 -0.01 -0.00001%
Germany 4,813 3,093 91 0.00333%
Poland 76 66 -0.25 -0.00006%
Spain 188 159 -0.56 -0.00004%
UK 40 29 -2.81 -0.00012%
Source: Own estimation
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from a legal perspective, since they are financed 
through an increase in tariffs paid by consumers, thus 
not directly affecting public accounts. These include 
in most countries support payments to renewable 
generation. We are not considering this form of sup-
port payments in our analysis.
It must be pointed out that, despite not being sub-
sidies, support payments to clean technologies fi-
nanced through energy tariffs, which include a large 
share of the subsidies to renewable generation, worry 
many (including the European energy regulators). 
Concerns are related to the fast growth of these sup-
port payments, and consequently of energy tariffs. 
This increase in tariffs does not reflect an increase in 
the cost of energy that a free market would deliver. 
It rather has the nature of a burden imposed upon 
consumers, which they cannot avoid by switching 
suppliers. Thus, from an economic point of view, sup-
port payments are not far different from a tax. The 
option to finance feed-in tariffs through general taxes 
is being currently discussed in several countries (e.g. 
in Spain), with proponents building on the argument 
that environmental benefits from low-C energy do 
not only affect electricity consumers (see also CEER, 
2011).
Our analysis of the impact of new climate policies 
on off-budget subsidies is based on data provided by 
EEA (2004) and IEEP (2007). According to the for-
mer report, overall off-budget subsidies for fossil fuel 
consumption in 2001 equaled €15.1bn (with €6.6bn 
to solids and €8.5bn for oil and natural gas). IEEP 
(2007) provides figures on the implicit subsidies in 
2004 resulting from the application of reduced VAT 
rates on fossil fuel consumption by households, as 
shown in Table 7. 
Due to the lack of additional information on the dis-
tribution of off-budget subsidies by country, we have 
assumed that overall fossil fuel off-budget subsidies 
paid by countries are proportional to those corre-
sponding to the application of reduced VAT rates to 
household energy consumption. Using this criterion 
we have allocated the overall amount of subsidies 
paid in the EU in 2001 to individual Member States. 
Using data on fossil fuel consumption in 2001 from 
EC (2009) we have computed the level of subsidies 
paid per unit of fuel of each type consumed in each 
country and have assumed that these remain con-
stant over time. We then have computed the amount 
of off-budget subsidies paid by each country in 2020 
for each type of fossil fuel and each policy scenario as 
the expected level of consumption of this fuel in this 
country and scenario, as reported in EC (2009), times 
the fuel-specific per-unit-subsidy in the country. The 
total impact of new climate policies on off-budget 
subsidies is calculated as the difference between the 
overall levels of these subsidies in both scenarios. 
Numerical results
Numerical results concerning the impact of new cli-
mate policies on off-budget subsidies within the EU 
are shown in Table 8. We provide the level of off-
budget subsidies paid to each main type of fossil fuel 
within each country and in the EU as a whole both 
in the years 2009 and 2020 in the Baseline scenario. 
These results are given in monetary units. Besides, we 
provide the increase in subsidies to each type of fuel 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to the 
Baseline, also in monetary units. Finally, we provide, 
both in monetary units and as a percentage of GDP, 
the overall increase in off-budget subsidies to fossil 
fuels in each country and in the EU as a whole. Nega-
tive increases in subsidies represent a reduction in 
State expenses and correspond therefore to positive 
impacts on the public budget. Data is provided only 
for those countries that subsidize the use of fossil fu-
els. 
http://think.eui.eu20
Final Report - June 2011
The level of off-budget subsidies in each scenario 
depends on the expected evolution of fossil fuel 
consumption in each country and the level of VAT 
rates applied on it. Off-budget subsidies in 2020 are 
projected to be lower for solids and natural gas than 
those in 2009 (the total decrease in fossil fuel sub-
sidies projected equals 14.8%), while subsidies for 
oil are expected to increase slightly. Subsidies in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario are expected to be lower 
than those in the Baseline for all fossil fuels. Due to 
the fact that in most Member States fossil fuel use is 
not subject to reduced VAT rates, the overall budget 
impact of new climate policies at EU level (€1.7bn) 
represents a small fraction of EU-27 GDP (0.012%). 
However, this impact is still much larger than the one 
computed for on-budget subsidies.
Significant reductions in subsidies relative to GDP 
are expected in Ireland and the UK in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
consumption of all fossil fuels is heavily subsidized in 
those two countries (VAT rates applied on fossil fu-
els are low). Other countries where the impact is ex-
pected not to be negligible are Portugal and Estonia. 
Table 7: Implicit subsidies from reduced VAT rates applied to households’ energy consumption
M€ in 2004 Solid fuels Fuel oil Natural gas Total by country
Belgium 6.7 - - 6.7
Estonia 0.5 - - 0.5
Greece - - 4.3 4.3
Hungary 1.2 - - 1.2
Ireland 11.5 30.6 52.9 95
Italy 0.3 - 114.2 114.5
Luxembourg - 2.7 12.5 15.2
Portugal - 26.5 39.0 65.5
UK 45.3 54.4 1907.8 2007.5
EU-25 total 65.5 114.2 2130.7
Source: IEEP (2007)
Table 8: Impact of changes in fossil fuel off-budget subsidies
Off-budget subsidies [M€] Difference 
[Enhanced Policy - Baseline 
scenario] 
Total 
impact 
[M€]
Total 
impact 
[% GDP]
Baseline (2009) Baseline (2020)
Solids Oil Gas Solids Oil Gas Solids Oil Gas
EU-27 6,004 418 9,101 5,745 424 7,051 -999 -13 -700 -1,711 -0.012%
Belgium 399 - - 439 - - -30 - - -30 -0.008%
Estonia 44 - - 48 - - -5 - - -5 -0.033%
Greece - - 27 - - 45 - - -9 -9 -0.003%
Hungary 97 - - 91 - - 0.29 - - 0.29 0.0003%
Ireland 998 123 221 1,100 133 263 -150 -5 -68 -223 -0.101%
Italy 0.04 - 517 41 - 566 -4 - -51 -55 -0.003%
Luxemb. - 13 76 - 13 91 - -0.45 -6 -7 -0.014%
Portugal - 89 256 - 85 251 - -2 -75 -78 -0.043%
UK 4,388 194 6,805 4,027 193 5,835 -810 -5 -490 -1,304 -0.055%
Source: Own estimation
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In Portugal, significant per-unit subsidies are granted 
to oil and gas. In Estonia, the level of coal consump-
tion in the Enhanced Policy scenario is expected to 
be significantly lower than that in the Baseline in ab-
solute terms (the carbon intensity of its economy is 
quite high). In Italy per-unit subsidies to natural gas 
are high (see Table 7), but the reduction in natural gas 
consumption in the Enhanced Policy scenario com-
pared to the Baseline is not substantial (-9%). Thus, 
the impact of the change in off-budget subsidies on 
the Italian public budget is negligible in relative terms. 
Hungary is the only country showing an increase in 
expenses that can, nevertheless, be considered negli-
gible. This is mainly due to the fact that the consump-
tion of coal, the only fossil fuel that is subsidized in 
that country, is expected to increase slightly when im-
plementing tighter policies while that of other fossil 
fuels is expected to decrease, though not significantly 
(the emission reduction objective for Hungary is not 
very ambitious).
For the remaining countries per unit subsidies result-
ing from reduced VAT rates applied on fossil fuels are 
low. Then, the resulting changes in off-budget subsi-
dies are expected to be also low. Additional figures on 
subsidies to high-C products are reported in Annex 
III.
3.1.3 Excise Taxes on Fossil Fuels
Basic assumptions and conceptual analysis
The application of new climate policies in the En-
hanced Policy scenario will typically result in lower 
consumption of fossil fuels and will therefore prompt 
a decrease in State revenues from excise taxes levied 
on these products. As already mentioned in the In-
troduction, carbon prices applied on fossil fuels have 
been taken to be additional to excise taxes, which we 
have assumed to remain unchanged over time regard-
less of the climate policies applied. In other words, ex-
cise tax levels in 2020 in both policy scenarios are the 
same as those in 2008, the most recent year for which 
official data are available.
We are aware that a reform of energy taxation is be-
ing currently discussed. This will probably involve a 
modification of existing excise taxes. However, the 
structure and level of future energy taxation remains 
unclear. Besides, carbon tax levels considered in our 
analysis, which are based on those reported in EC 
(2009) and other studies in the literature, seem not to 
be high enough to achieve the decrease in the use of 
fossil fuels (mainly oil) needed to meet the 20-20-20 
objectives if excise taxes are not in place.12
Instead of considering excise tax rates properly speak-
ing, we have considered implicit energy tax rates as 
displayed in Table 5. We have used implicit tax rates 
instead of statutory excise duties because there are 
significant differences across Member States in the 
level of excise duties applied on each type of use and 
consumer of a certain fuel (EC, 2010). Implicit tax 
rates allow us to make a rough but reasonable and 
easy to compute estimate of the level of fiscal pressure 
on each fossil fuel.
Oil is the most heavily taxed fossil fuel in all Euro-
pean States, with sizable differences among tax levels 
in different countries. In the UK, Sweden, Denmark, 
12 Fossil fuel consumption levels in the Baseline and En-
hanced Policy scenarios in EC (2009) do not seem compatible 
with the replacement of excise taxes on fossil fuels with carbon 
taxes of the value reported in this study for the Enhanced Policy 
scenario. Revenues from excise taxes projected for 2020, assum-
ing that the level of these taxes remains unchanged, are much 
larger than those from carbon pricing for carbon price levels re-
ported. This implies that the average level of fossil fuel excise tax-
es per unit of carbon content is larger than that of carbon prices. 
Thus, replacing the former with the latter is unlikely to result in 
a reduction in oil consumption, which is the fuel currently most 
heavily taxed. However, oil consumption in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario is lower than that in the Baseline. This requires the ap-
plication of some form of energy taxes in addition to carbon taxes 
reported.
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Germany, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic tax-
es on oil are highest (> 0.3 M€/1000 toe), while in 
Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Belgium, Greece, Roma-
nia and Spain implicit tax rates are relatively low (< 
0.2 M€/1000 toe). Regarding other high-C products, 
coal and natural gas implicit tax rates are negligible in 
almost all cases, with the exception of those in Den-
mark, Sweden and the Netherlands (only for natural 
gas). 
Incremental revenues from excise taxes in the En-
hanced Policy scenario amount to the difference be-
tween fossil fuel consumption in 2020 in both policy 
scenarios times the implicit tax rates calculated for 
the year 2008. 
Numerical results
Numerical results on changes in public revenues from 
excise taxes on fossil fuels resulting from new climate 
Table 9: Changes in excise taxes applied on fossil fuels
Revenues from excise taxes in 
2008 from fuel (Baseline)[M€]
Revenues from excise taxes in 
2020 from fuel (Baseline) [M€] Impact of fuel Enhanced Baseline in 2020 [M€]
Total impact on 
public budget 
(Solids +Oil + Gas)
Solids Oil Gas Solids Oil Gas Solids Oil Gas [M€] [% GDP]
EU-27 505 171,007 9,624 464 166,369 9,630 -47 -5947 -900 -6,894 -0.05
Austria - 4,035 374 - 3,842 407 - -105 -89 -194 -0.06
Belgium 34 3,751 50 37 3,583 55 -3 -135 -7 -145 -0.04
Bulgaria 7 977 - 7 1,036 - -1 -26 - -27 -0.08
Cyprus - 254 - - 227 - - -10 - -10 -0.05
Czech R. 48 3,237 43 42 3,638 44 - -65 -4 -69 -0.04
Denmark 167 2,452 561 133 2,316 537 -18 -50 -54 -122 -0.05
Estonia - 296 6 0.09 331 7 - -17 - -18 -0.12
Finland 91 2,234 88 80 2,039 86 -9 -123 -12 -144 -0.07
France 6 23,965 254 5 21,779 262 -1 -1,043 -52 -1,096 -0.05
Germany 33 35,797 2,314 32 32,041 2,355 -1 -691 -217 -910 -0.03
Greece 22 3,037 - 22 2,974 - -2 -165 - -166 -0.06
Hungary - 2,117 100 - 2,353 100 - -36 -8 -44 -0.04
Ireland - 2,217 - - 2,407 - - -97 - -97 -0.04
Italy 50 21,366 2,557 57 20,523 2,799 -5 -1,428 -253 -1,686 -0.10
Lithuania - 422 - 0.61 767 - - -7 - -7 -0.02
Luxemb. 1 416 - 0.15 517 - - -34 - -34 -0.07
Latvia - 952 5 - 565 6 3 -11 - -8 -0.05
Malta - 78 - - 53 - - -2 - -2 -0.03
Netherl. 14 6,626 2,571 17 6,408 2,341 - -101 -114 -215 -0.03
Poland - 6,901 - - 8,264 - - -375 - -375 -0.09
Portugal - 2,713 - - 2,578 - - -68 - -68 -0.04
Romania 4 1,993 33 5 2,266 31 - -67 -2 -69 -0.05
Slovak. R - 1,088 5 0.43 1,195 5 - -73 - -73 -0.10
Slovenia - 823 3 0.32 1,033 4 - -64 -1 -65 -0.15
Spain - 12,454 - - 13,306 - - -368 - -368 -0.03
Sweden 27 4,603 100 27 4,322 11 -9 -175 -46 -231 -0.06
UK - 26,208 559 - 26,005 479 - -612 -40 -652 -0.03
Source: Own estimation
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policies are shown in Table 9. This includes the level 
of revenues from taxes applied on each main type of 
fossil fuel within each country and the EU-27 as a 
whole both in the year 2008 and in the year 2020 in 
the Baseline scenario. These revenues are expressed 
in monetary units. Besides, we provide the increase 
in revenues from excise taxes applied on each type of 
fuel in the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to 
the Baseline. Finally, we include also, both in mon-
etary units and as a percentage of the GDP, the overall 
decrease in revenues from excise taxes on fossil fuels 
in each country and in the EU as a whole. Negative 
numbers represent a reduction in revenues from ex-
cise taxes (a decrease in revenues) while positive ones 
represent a revenue increase.
Given that oil is the most heavily taxed type of fuel, 
decreases in overall revenues are mainly due to a de-
crease in oil consumption. The overall EU-27 decrease 
in revenues from excise taxes due to the application 
of new policies is about €6.9bn (0.05% of the GDP). 
Revenues from excise taxes in 2020 in the Baseline 
scenario are €5bn lower than those in 2009 (-2.74% 
change in revenues). However, in some countries 
revenues from oil taxation are higher in 2020 than in 
2009. This is the case of ten “new” Member States (i.e., 
Bulgaria, Czech. Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) 
plus Ireland and Spain. Most of these countries had 
low GDP per capita levels and economies with a low 
carbon intensity in 1990 (having a low level of indus-
trialization). In the following years these countries 
experienced high economic growth at the expense of 
increasing their emissions. Taking this into account, 
2020 GHG emission reduction objectives for these 
countries have been set to allow them to have a higher 
level of emissions than in 1990.
Differences among countries in the incremental 
revenues from excise taxes in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario can be explained in terms of the expected 
evolution of oil consumption in both scenarios and 
implicit tax rates on oil in each country. Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Italy and Slovakia show the largest decreases 
in tax revenues in the Enhanced Policy scenario in 
terms of percentage points of their GDP (> 0.1%). 
Italy and Slovakia are expected to experience large 
decreases in oil consumption in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario (the decrease in revenues and oil consump-
tion in Italy is the largest in Europe). Large decreases 
in tax revenues to be experienced by Estonia and Slo-
venia are due both to the fact that their level of oil 
consumption decreases substantially in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario and to the fact that excise rates ap-
plied in these countries are high. Countries, like Lux-
embourg, where excise taxes are very high also tend 
to experience large decreases in revenues with the ap-
plication of tighter climate policies.
Lithuania and the Netherlands are the two coun-
tries expected to experience the lowest decrease in 
revenues from excise taxes in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario. In both countries, both the reduction in oil 
consumption due to the application of new policies 
and excise taxes applied are deemed to be low. Results 
obtained are represented graphically in Annex III.
3.2 Stand-Alone Impact of New 
Climate Policies on the Output of the 
Economy
3.2.1 Basic Assumptions and Conceptual 
Analysis
The implementation of climate policy instruments 
will affect decisions made by economic agents and, 
therefore, the allocation of resources to economic ac-
tivities. This will certainly alter the composition and 
size of the global output of the economy (GDP). In 
our analysis, we focus on estimating the change in 
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the level of GDP that will result from new policies ap-
plied within the Enhanced Policy scenario. We have 
identified three main changes in economic activities 
brought about by these policies. First, high-C prod-
ucts and services will be replaced by those low-C ones 
that are already technologically available. Second, 
Member States will obtain revenues and incur ex-
penses from the application of new climate policies. 
In each country, climate policies will entail budget 
revenues coming from certain economic activities 
and expenditures in favor of other activities. This will 
alter the value of economic production. Finally, the 
development of new clean technologies will have to 
be publicly supported to comply with long-term cli-
mate policy objectives. 
In the remainder of this section we discuss each of 
these three components in turn and describe the 
modeling we have carried out. Other effects of cli-
mate policy on GDP, like for instance the expected in-
crease in the latter resulting from the improvement of 
climate conditions, can be assumed not to be sizable 
within the time horizon considered in our analysis. 
A- Impact of the decrease in GHG emissions
Reducing GHG emissions involves allocating fewer 
resources to high-C products and services. These will 
be partially replaced by lower-C ones. However, a 
large fraction of low-C products and services are not 
yet cost competitive. In other words, market agents 
are not willing to buy and/or sell them because their 
market value per monetary unit of resources (en-
dowment) is deemed to be lower than that of high-C 
products in the short-term. Note that relevant budget 
impacts of the use of high-C products related to their 
negative effects on the environment, as well as some 
other benefits brought about by the use of low-C 
products, will most probably only materialize in the 
medium- to long-term. As a result, and also in line 
with various estimates in the literature, the level of 
economic growth will, at least transitionally, decrease 
compared to the business-as-usual scenario (BAU). 
Hence, the total system output (market value of all 
products and services) will be negatively affected in 
the short- to medium-term by the decarbonization 
of the economy (see also Pissarides, 2008; Acemoglu 
et al., 2010). In the long-term, the efficiency of the 
economy may increase due to the adoption, induced 
by the existing restriction on carbon emissions, of 
cleaner, more energy efficient, technologies whose 
economic potential is higher than that of traditional, 
fossil-fuel-based, ones. Box 2 highlights a few consid-
erations to take into account when assessing the GDP 
impact of policies focused on the decarbonization of 
the economy.
The economic impact of the shift from high- to low-C 
products will depend on the type of products/services 
replaced and those replacing them. Our analysis does 
not make use of a complex simulation model able to 
take into account all the existing economic interde-
pendencies among activities. Thus, we have assumed 
that the decrease in the level of the overall economic 
output resulting from the shift to low-C products 
roughly coincides with the level of costs incurred by 
industries when abating carbon. In other words, we 
have computed the GDP impact of the additional 
reduction in GHG emissions taking place in the En-
hanced Policy scenario as the overall extra carbon 
abatement costs incurred in this scenario.13
13  Th e increase in production costs of an economic activ-
ity ‘A’ resulting from a shift to lower-C end products is equal to 
the change in the market value of inputs to this activity. Products 
‘I1’ no longer used as an input to this activity (i.e. those no longer 
used as intermediate products) can now be sold as end products 
or be used as inputs to other economic activities being at the mar-
gin leading to an increase in the overall market value of end prod-
ucts in the economy (GDP). At the same time, new inputs ‘I2’ to 
activity ‘A’ become intermediate products in this activity and can, 
therefore, no longer be sold as end products or be used as inputs 
to other activities, thus leading to a decrease in the GDP.
Carbon abatement costs incurred in activity ‘A’ may lead to an in-
crease in the price of the final products of this activity. However, 
assuming that exports and consumer savings remain unchanged, 
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However, estimating the GDP impact of climate poli-
cies according to carbon abatement costs incurred 
has some limitations. Future abatement costs are typ-
ically computed assuming that emission reductions 
will take place in an efficient way, i.e. taking advan-
tage of the most economical abatement opportunities 
available. This does not consider the fact that climate 
policies applied aim to deploy selected technologies 
the increase in end consumer expenses on products from activ-
ity ‘A’ needs to be cancelled out by a decrease in their expenses 
in other products. Then, one may assume that the GDP change 
resulting from an increase in the price of end products in activity 
‘A’ is zero.
Overall, given optimal production decisions, the shift from high- 
to low-C products within activity ‘A’ should lead to a net decrease 
in the market value of end production equal to the difference be-
tween the market value of ‘I2’ and ‘I1’, i.e. the carbon abatement 
costs incurred in ‘A’.
that are less mature than other clean ones.14 Besides, 
abatement costs incurred in a system do not take into 
account the loss of competitiveness of the economy 
resulting from the increase in the price of local pro-
duction. Given the limitations of the approach here 
considered, and the wide range of estimates in the lit-
erature on the medium-term impact that the shift to 
14  According to static economic efficiency principles, 
emission reduction targets for both types of sectors should be set 
such that abatement is consistent with the existence of a unique 
carbon price reflecting the overall system marginal abatement 
cost. However, authorities are expected to support the installa-
tion and use of RES generation technologies to engender learning 
by doing. Then, energy efficient technologies in non-ETS sectors 
(many of which are already cost competitive) will be used to a 
lesser extent than what is economically efficient from a short-
term perspective. Thus, on average, unit carbon abatement costs, 
and prices, incurred in ETS sectors are expected to be higher than 
those in non-ETS sectors.
Box 2: Approaches to macro-economic consequences of climate policy
It is important to highlight that the discussion of the 
effect of climate policies on the economy always has 
to be regarded within the analytical setting applied. 
First, as already discussed above, revenue recycling 
can mitigate welfare losses resulting from the shift to 
low-C products through a reduction in previously ex-
isting distortionary taxes (see Goulder, 1995; Sandmo, 
2000; Weizsäcker and Jesinghaus, 1992; Pissarides, 
2008; Andersen and Ekins, 2009). Thereby, alternative 
mechanisms of recycling can lead to different impacts 
of climate policy on GDP (see e.g. Cambridge Econom-
ics, 2008; Andersen, 2009; Lutz and Meyer, 2010).
Second, short-term GDP effects of climate policy dif-
fer from long-term effects. In the short-term, wages 
and the demand for energy can be deemed almost 
inelastic and the set of technologies available is giv-
en. As a consequence, increases in production costs 
stemming from carbon pricing will translate into 
higher prices and result in a reduction of both the 
output and demand in the system, which will result 
in a lower and less efficient employment of produc-
tion factors and, therefore, in a lower system output. 
In the longer-term, however, part of these effects will 
fade out. Wages and demand will adapt to the new 
situation. The former will fall triggering an increase in 
labor supply, while the latter will shift to cleaner, less 
energy-intensive goods, which, together with direct 
public financial support, will drive an increase in the 
competitiveness of low-C technologies.
Finally, several factors like the substitutability of in-
puts to production processes or the design made of 
environmental regulation may affect the long term 
effects of this regulation on public budgets and the 
economy as a whole. The reader is referred to Acemo-
glu et al. (2010) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) to 
get further discussions on these issues.
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low-C products will have on the output of the econo-
my, in Section 5 we analyze the sensitivity of the over-
all impact of new climate policies on the budget of 
Member States to changes in the GDP impact of the 
decarbonization of the economy. 
Taking into account local emission abatement oppor-
tunities expected to exist in 2020, industry and aca-
demia have published estimates of carbon abatement 
costs for various EU countries as well as the EU as a 
whole. Unit abatement costs will, of course, depend on 
the amount of carbon already abated, since the cheap-
est opportunities tend to be exhausted first. Hence, 
carbon abatement costs typically are represented in the 
form of curves providing their evolution with the over-
all amount of carbon already abated (Marginal Abate-
ment Cost Curves, or MACC). We have made use of 
the MACCs available in the literature15 to estimate, 
for each EU country, the unit cost of reducing carbon 
emissions in the Enhanced Policy scenario with re-
spect to those in the Baseline. Unit costs in a country 
have been obtained as the average value of the MACC 
for this country between those points corresponding to 
carbon emissions abated in the Baseline and Enhanced 
Policy scenarios. The overall cost of the extra amount 
of carbon abated in the latter can be computed as this 
unit cost times the size of the reduction in emissions.
Given that MACCs were not available for all EU coun-
tries, we have clustered Member States into three 
groups, i.e. low, medium and high carbon abatement 
cost countries, and computed a single 2020 unit abate-
ment cost value for each of these groups. Countries 
have been allocated to these groups according to the 
carbon intensity of their economy projected for the 
15  Relevant works include Mckinsey UK, 2009; HM 
Government, 2009; Stern Review, 2008; Mckinsey Sweden, 2008; 
Mckinsey Germany, 2007; Gracceva and Ciorba, 2008; Stankev-
icute et al., 2007; Morris et al., 2008; Kitous and Criqui, 2009; 
Mckinsey Poland, 2008; Mckinsey CZ, 2008; and Cleto et al., 
2007.
year 2020 in EC (2009).16 Table 10 shows the values 
of the unit carbon abatement costs considered in our 
analysis for countries whose economy has a high, me-
dium and low carbon intensity. Separate values have 
been estimated for each of the three possible future 
situations that we have envisaged regarding the general 
evolution of carbon abatement costs.
B- Impact of State revenues and expenses 
We are examining the isolated effect of climate policies 
on public budgets, considering neither any recycling of 
State revenues from these policies, nor the sourcing of 
funds injected into the economy through them. Thus, 
revenues obtained correspond to funds that are not 
given any economic use in our analysis, while climate 
policy related expenses allow the States to finance extra 
economic activities. 
If both revenue neutral climate policies and revenue or 
expense generating ones are to achieve emission reduc-
tion objectives, the overall carbon content of economic 
activities taking place under these two types of policy 
regimes should be the same. Then, the set of economic 
activities that State revenues are drained from (taking 
place under revenue neutral policies but not under 
the policy regime considered here) need to have the 
same overall carbon content as the set of extra activi-
ties financed through State expenses (taking place un-
der policies of the type considered here but not under 
revenue neutral policies). This implies that the carbon 
content of activities being the source of State revenues, 
or being financed by public expenses, should decrease 
with the absolute value of net State revenues. Thus, for 
example, if policies applied only produced State reve-
nues or expenses, the carbon content of these activities 
should be zero.
16  Note that, generally speaking, countries where carbon 
intensity is high are the ones where abating further amounts of 
carbon is cheaper because they typically have not exhausted yet 
the most economical abatement opportunities.
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Aiming to make a conservative estimate of the impact 
of climate policy on GDP, and given that, according to 
the discussion above, the productivity level of activi-
ties is positively correlated with their carbon content, 
we have assumed a value of one for the capital-output 
ratio of activities being affected by the existence of 
State expenses or revenues. This value, which is clear-
ly below the average capital-output ratio of produc-
tive activities, may be deemed representative of the 
productivity of clean activities. Then, the change in 
the level of the output of the economy caused by the 
existence of State revenues and expenses associated 
with climate policy can be considered to be equal to 
the net amount of State revenues with opposite sign. 
C- Impact of the development of new clean tech-
nologies 
The short-term social value (or contribution to eco-
nomic output) of clean innovation publicly funded 
can be assumed to be zero if technologies being sup-
ported are not mature enough to be used in the short-
term and knowledge produced cannot be applied at 
that same time in other fields either. In this case, all 
public innovation investments can be deemed to rep-
resent a short-term efficiency loss. In the long-term, 
of course, clean RD&D leads to the availability of 
more efficient technologies to meet system needs, be-
sides their value originating from the reduction they 
cause in the carbon footprint. Public support of inno-
vation represents an important and necessary means 
to trigger socially beneficial research activities which 
are not conducted spontaneously by the private sec-
tor due to market failures at stake (see e.g. Martin and 
Scott, 2000; Foxon, 2003; and Hall and Lerner, 2009). 
Not being productive in the short-term, public ex-
penses on clean innovation result in a short-term re-
duction in the output of the economy with respect to 
the situation where all climate policy State expenses 
finance activities with a capital-output ratio of ‘1’, as 
assumed in Section B. This GDP reduction is equal to 
the level of public innovation expenses. For the sake 
of simplicity, we have assumed that public support of 
innovation is neither replacing private innovation in-
vestments, nor triggering further private investments 
beyond those that market agents would already be 
willing to afford in the absence of any public support.
3.2.2 Numerical Results: Overall Impact of Cli-
mate Policy on GDP
Authors in EC (2009) predict a GDP increase for the 
EU-27 as a whole of above 20% in the period 2010-
2020, i.e. from €11,386bn in 2010 to €14,164bn in 
2020. We have computed the impact of new climate 
policies on the GDP in 2020 for each of the three 
different future carbon abatement cost trends con-
sidered (see Table 11). Overall EU-27 GDP changes 
range between 0.02% (an almost negligible increase) 
for low abatement costs and -0.43% for high abate-
Table 10: Different future trends of unit carbon abatement costs for different country types
Unit carbon abatement cost trend [€/tCO
2
]
High Medium Low
High carbon intensity 
[> 0.5 tCO
2
/k€ output] 30 15 0
Medium carbon intensity 55 40 25
Low carbon intensity 
[< 0.25 tCO
2
/k€ output] 75 60 45
Source: Own assumptions
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ment costs. The GDP impact of not considering any 
recycling of public revenues from climate policies and 
that of using low-C products instead of high-C ones 
are much more relevant than short-term efficiency 
losses associated with public innovation investments.
The overall GDP impact is largely in inverse propor-
tion to the level of carbon abatement costs. This is 
coherent with the fact that both State revenues from 
carbon pricing, which are the main component of net 
State revenues, and the cost of the shift to low-C prod-
ucts are proportional to the level of carbon abatement 
costs. Differences among the GDP impacts experi-
enced by different countries can be mainly explained 
in terms of their net State revenues from new policies, 
which are, in turn, dominated by the extra revenues 
from carbon pricing to be obtained by countries in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario. Those countries get-
ting the largest extra revenues from carbon pricing 
when implementing the full 2020 policy package are 
Table 11: Overall impact of new climate policies on the GDP
GDP in 2020 Medium abatement cost Low abatement cost High abatement cost
[bn€] [bn€] [%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP]
EU-27 14164.0 -29.0 -0.20 2.5 0.02 -60.4 -0.43
Austria 310.4 -0.8 -0.25 -0.1 -0.02 -1.5 -0.48
Belgium 389.5 -0.9 -0.24 -0.1 -0.02 -1.8 -0.46
Bulgaria 34.7 0.0 0.07 0.4 1.02 -0.3 -0.88
Cyprus 22.5 0.0 -0.22 0.0 0.05 -0.1 -0.49
Czech Republic 154.2 -0.4 -0.26 0.4 0.27 -1.2 -0.79
Denmark 245.9 -0.4 -0.15 0.0 0.00 -0.7 -0.30
Estonia 15.4 0.1 0.47 0.2 1.01 0.0 -0.08
Finland 201.4 -0.2 -0.08 0.2 0.09 -0.5 -0.25
France 2144.4 -6.2 -0.29 -1.9 -0.09 -10.5 -0.49
Germany 2723.6 -2.6 -0.09 2.2 0.08 -7.3 -0.27
Greece 290.6 -0.4 -0.14 0.3 0.11 -1.1 -0.39
Hungary 114.8 -0.7 -0.57 0.0 -0.04 -1.3 -1.10
Ireland 221.7 -0.9 -0.42 -0.3 -0.14 -1.5 -0.70
Italy 1678.7 -2.7 -0.16 0.7 0.04 -6.2 -0.37
Latvia 17.4 -0.2 -0.95 0.0 -0.23 -0.3 -1.67
Lithuania 30.3 -0.2 -0.52 0.0 0.06 -0.3 -1.09
Luxembourg 47.3 -0.2 -0.33 0.0 -0.06 -0.3 -0.61
Malta 6.8 0.0 -0.06 0.0 0.14 0.0 -0.25
Netherlands 637.9 -0.9 -0.14 0.3 0.04 -2.0 -0.32
Poland 406.1 -0.7 -0.16 1.7 0.43 -3.0 -0.75
Portugal 179.6 -0.6 -0.35 -0.1 -0.06 -1.1 -0.64
Romania 135.0 -0.8 -0.62 0.2 0.16 -1.9 -1.40
Slovak R. 73.3 -0.1 -0.14 0.2 0.30 -0.4 -0.59
Slovenia 44.0 -0.1 -0.22 0.1 0.19 -0.3 -0.62
Spain 1285.2 -3.2 -0.25 -0.1 -0.01 -6.2 -0.49
Sweden 380.3 -0.6 -0.16 -0.1 -0.03 -1.1 -0.29
UK 2373.0 -5.4 -0.23 -1.6 -0.07 -9.2 -0.39
Source: Own calculations
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the ones whose economic output is decreasing to the 
largest extent in the Enhanced Policy with respect to 
the Baseline scenario. Thus, Latvia, Romania, Hun-
gary and Lithuania are experiencing GDP reductions 
of -0.95%, -0.62%, -0.57% and -0.52%, respectively, 
when considering a medium level of abatement costs. 
On the other hand, those countries whose extra rev-
enues from carbon pricing in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario are lowest are also the ones whose GDP is 
expected to experience the largest increase (positive). 
Thus, Bulgaria and Estonia are experiencing GDP in-
creases of 0.07% and 0.47% of their GDP, respectively, 
in the medium abatement cost future. 
As discussed in Section 3, incremental State revenues 
from carbon pricing depend mainly on the carbon in-
tensity of the economy, the share of GHG emissions 
from non-ETS sectors and the level of additional re-
ductions in emissions taking place in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario. The larger the carbon intensity of 
the economy is, the larger the absolute value of extra 
revenues from carbon pricing in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario. However, this increase may be positive or 
negative. The larger the share of emissions from non-
ETS sectors in total emissions, the more positive in-
cremental State revenues are in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario, while the larger the reduction in GHG emis-
sions in this scenario, the more negative incremental 
revenues should be.
Reductions in the GDP growth originating from the 
shift to low-C products are in direct proportion to 
unit abatement costs and the amount of emissions 
abated. The effect of the carbon intensity of the econ-
omy on carbon abatement costs is mixed because 
emission reductions to be achieved tend to increase 
with it (with some exceptions like the Czech Republic 
or Hungary), but unit carbon abatement costs tend 
to decrease. Affluent countries whose economies al-
ready have medium-to-low carbon intensity may still 
be asked to achieve significant emission reductions 
leading to large local abatement costs (examples are 
the UK and Finland). Additional figures graphically 
representing results obtained are provided in Annex 
III, Figure 6.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to stress that the 
numbers just discussed have to be regarded as high-
ly speculative. Properly assessing changes in overall 
GDP induced by climate policies would require a 
detailed general equilibrium model, and even in that 
case results would be “model-dependent”. Our results 
rest on a few, ad hoc, albeit reasonable, assumptions. 
This makes carrying out sensitivity analysis a manda-
tory task. A word of caveat is therefore in order. 
3.3 Impact of Climate Policy Driven 
Changes in GDP on Tax Revenues and 
State Expenses
3.3.1 Conceptual Analysis and Modeling of 
the Impact
This section discusses the effect that changes in GDP 
growth, and hence changes in the level of economic 
output, caused by new policies will have on public 
budgets. The base of most taxes, as well as the average 
tax rate, will change with the GDP. Main taxes affected 
include VAT and excise taxes applied on products and 
services, corporate taxes, income taxes and social se-
curity contributions. Analogously, the number of re-
cipients of certain State subsidies and social expenses, 
as well as the average level of expenses incurred per 
recipient, is expected to change with a change in GDP. 
Main expenses affected include subsidies for unem-
ployed people and possibly also pension payments.
We have collected official data on the elasticities of 
State revenues and expenses with respect to GDP. 
Percentage changes in State revenues and expenses 
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resulting from changes in GDP caused by new cli-
mate policies have been computed as the aforemen-
tioned percent changes in GDP times the elasticities 
of State revenues, respectively State expenses. Data on 
revenue and expense elasticities have been obtained 
from EC (2006) for all EU countries but Bulgaria and 
Romania. Elasticities for these two countries have 
been assumed equal to the average of those for the 
remaining “new” Member States.
3.3.2 Numerical Results
Estimates on the evolution of GDP in the EU reported 
in EC (2009) suggest that State revenues will increase 
Table 12: Impact of climate policy driven changes in the GDP on State revenues
State 
revenues 
from taxes 
as % of GDP 
(2009)
GDP elastic-
ity of State 
revenues       
Medium abatement  
cost
Low abatement  
cost
High abatement  
cost
  [%]  [p.u.]  [bn€]  [%GDP]  [bn€]  [%GDP]  [bn€]  [%GDP] 
EU-27 39.2  -11.7 -0.08 0.7 0.00 -24.0 -0.17
Austria 42.8 0.96 -0.3 -0.10 0.0 -0.01 -0.6 -0.20
Belgium 44.3 1 -0.4 -0.11 0.0 -0.01 -0.8 -0.21
Bulgaria 33.3 0.961 0.0 0.02 0.1 0.33 -0.1 -0.28
Cyprus 39.2 1.14 0.0 -0.10 0.0 0.02 0.0 -0.22
Czech Republic 36.1 0.99 -0.1 -0.09 0.1 0.10 -0.4 -0.28
Denmark 48.2 1 -0.2 -0.07 0.0 0.00 -0.4 -0.15
Estonia 32.2 0.88 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.29 0.0 -0.02
Finland 43.1 0.92 -0.1 -0.03 0.1 0.04 -0.2 -0.10
France 42.8 0.98 -2.6 -0.12 -0.8 -0.04 -4.4 -0.21
Germany 39.3 0.97 -1.0 -0.04 0.8 0.03 -2.8 -0.10
Greece 32.6 1.07 -0.1 -0.05 0.1 0.04 -0.4 -0.14
Hungary 40.4 1.02 -0.3 -0.23 0.0 -0.02 -0.5 -0.45
Ireland 29.3 1.14 -0.3 -0.14 -0.1 -0.05 -0.5 -0.23
Italy 42.8 1.17 -1.4 -0.08 0.4 0.02 -3.1 -0.19
Latvia 28.9 0.89 0.0 -0.24 0.0 -0.06 -0.1 -0.43
Lithuania 30.3 0.9 0.0 -0.14 0.0 0.02 -0.1 -0.30
Luxembourg 35.6 1.14 -0.1 -0.13 0.0 -0.02 -0.1 -0.25
Malta 34.5 1.04 0.0 -0.02 0.0 0.05 0.0 -0.09
Netherlands 39.1 1.01 -0.3 -0.05 0.1 0.02 -0.8 -0.12
Poland 34.3 0.91 -0.2 -0.05 0.5 0.13 -0.9 -0.23
Portugal 36.7 1.08 -0.2 -0.14 0.0 -0.02 -0.5 -0.25
Romania 28 0.961 -0.2 -0.17 0.1 0.04 -0.5 -0.38
Slovak Republic 29.1 0.88 0.0 -0.04 0.1 0.08 -0.1 -0.15
Slovenia 37.3 0.96 0.0 -0.08 0.0 0.07 -0.1 -0.22
Spain 33.1 1.09 -1.1 -0.09 0.0 0.00 -2.3 -0.18
Sweden 47.1 0.94 -0.3 -0.07 -0.1 -0.01 -0.5 -0.13
UK 37.3 1.1 -2.2 -0.09 -0.6 -0.03 -3.8 -0.16
Source: Own calculation
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by about 24% in the period 2010-2020 (assuming that 
State revenues are proportional to GDP). State reve-
nues and expenses may nevertheless experience some 
variations related to climate policies applied and their 
impact on GDP. Values computed in our analysis for 
the impact of changes to GDP driven by new climate 
policies on State revenues and expenses are shown in 
Table 12 and Table 13, respectively. These tables also 
provide the level of fiscal pressure in each country 
(State revenues within each country as a percentage 
of GDP) as well as values of State revenue and ex-
pense elasticities employed. Expenditure elasticities 
consider mainly unemployment-related effects.
Table 13: Impact of climate policy driven changes in the GDP on State expenses
State rev-
enues from 
taxes as % 
of GDP           
GDP elastic-
ity of State 
expenses       
Medium abatement cost Low abatement cost High abatement cost
  [%]  [p.u.]*             [bn€]**         [%GDP]  [bn€]**        [%GDP] [bn€]**               [%GDP] 
EU-27 39.2  1.4 0.01 -0.3 0.00 3.1 0.02
Austria 42.8 -0.08 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.1 0.02
Belgium 44.3 -0.16 0.1 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.1 0.03
Bulgaria 33.3 -0.056 0.0 0.00 0.0 -0.02 0.0 0.02
Cyprus 39.2 -0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
Czech Republic 36.1 -0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Denmark 48.2 -0.3 0.1 0.02 0.0 0.00 0.1 0.04
Estonia 32.2 -0.05 0.0 -0.01 0.0 -0.02 0.0 0.00
Finland 43.1 -0.21 0.0 0.01 0.0 -0.01 0.0 0.02
France 42.8 -0.12 0.3 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.5 0.03
Germany 39.3 -0.27 0.3 0.01 -0.2 -0.01 0.8 0.03
Greece 32.6 -0.04 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Hungary 40.4 -0.03 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Ireland 29.3 -0.16 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.01 0.1 0.03
Italy 42.8 -0.04 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.1 0.01
Latvia 28.9 -0.05 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.02
Lithuania 30.3 -0.03 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Luxembourg 35.6 -0.04 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Malta 34.5 -0.02 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
Netherlands 39.1 -0.42 0.1 0.02 0.0 -0.01 0.3 0.05
Poland 34.3 -0.17 0.0 0.01 -0.1 -0.02 0.2 0.04
Portugal 36.7 -0.09 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.02
Romania 28 -0.056 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.02
Slovak Republic 29.1 -0.04 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.01
Slovenia 37.3 -0.13 0.0 0.01 0.0 -0.01 0.0 0.03
Spain 33.1 -0.16 0.2 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.3 0.03
Sweden 47.1 -0.19 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.1 0.03
UK 37.3 -0.05 0.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.2 0.01
* Only unemployment expenses deemed to be affected.  ** Assuming State expenses equal revenues.
Source: Own calculation
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Changes in State revenues are in direct proportion 
to increases in GDP driven by new climate policies 
and to revenue elasticities with respect to the latter. 
Revenue elasticities are typically close to unity, even 
though they tend to be smaller for the ten “new” 
Member States than within the EU-15. Therefore, 
differences among countries in the impact of poli-
cies on State revenues are close to be proportional to 
differences among the GDP impacts of these policies. 
When considering medium future carbon abatement 
costs, overall State revenues in Europe are expected 
to decrease by about €12bn, or about 0.08% of the 
EU-27 GDP in 2020, due to the effect of new climate 
policies on economic output. The largest increases 
in revenues are obtained for Bulgaria and Estonia, 
whose GDP increase is also the largest. Thus, when 
considering low abatement costs, Bulgaria and Esto-
nia experience increases in their State revenues in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario equal to 0.33 and 0.29% of 
their GDP, respectively. This amounts to about 1% of 
their overall State revenues. The opposite occurs in 
countries like Hungary or Latvia, whose GDP growth 
experiences a relevant decrease as a result of the ap-
plication of new policies. As a consequence of climate 
policy driven changes to its GDP, Hungary State rev-
enues are expected to decrease by 0.45% of its GDP 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario when carbon abate-
ment costs are assumed to be high. This represents 
a reduction of about 1% of its total State revenues. 
Those of Latvia are expected to decrease by 0.43% of 
its GDP, or about 1.5% of total State revenues. Coun-
tries with higher than one revenue elasticity are gen-
erally those applying progressive taxes, while those 
with low revenue elasticities typically are applying flat 
rate taxes that result in regressive tax schemes.
The impact of GDP changes caused by new climate 
policies on State expenses depends on the level of the 
GDP impact of new policies and the value of State ex-
pense elasticities, which varies significantly across the 
countries. Those countries whose expenses increase 
more due to the application of new climate policies 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario are either: i) those 
whose GDP elasticity of expenses is more negative, 
like the Netherlands or Denmark; ii) those whose 
GDP decreases the most in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario with respect to the Baseline, like Latvia; or iii) 
those that have a negative and significant expense 
elasticity and whose GDP decreases substantially in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario, like Romania, Ireland, 
France or Sweden. Increases in State expenses result-
ing from climate policy driven changes to GDP range 
from -0.02% of its GDP for Bulgaria (a decrease in 
costs), if carbon abatement costs are low, to 0.05% of 
its GDP for the Netherlands if abatement costs are 
high. Thus, they are expected to be substantially low-
er in absolute value than changes in State revenues 
just discussed.
Obviously, State revenues will decrease and expenses 
increase to a larger extent the higher carbon abate-
ment costs are. Additional figures are provided in An-
nex III, Figure 7 and Figure 8.
3.4 Overall Indirect Impact of New 
Policies on the Budget
Among the indirect impacts of climate policy on pub-
lic budgets, the most relevant is probably the change 
in revenues stemming from the effect that climate 
policies have on the level of the output of the econo-
my. The net indirect impact of new policies amounts 
to -0.13% of the EU-27 GDP (a decrease in net pub-
lic revenues) when carbon abatement costs (CACs) 
considered are medium within the range possible. 
According to the assumptions we made, the higher 
CACs are, the larger the decrease in public revenues, 
and therefore the indirect impact of climate policies, 
should be. Net indirect impacts computed range from 
a decrease in net revenues of about 0.03% of the EU 
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GDP for low CACs to a decrease of about 0.23% of 
the EU GDP for high CACs. Those countries, like 
Latvia, Hungary or Romania, experiencing the largest 
decrease in their GDP due to new climate policies are 
also the ones suffering the largest and more negative 
indirect impact of these policies on the budget (rep-
resenting a decrease in net State revenues of between 
0.2 and 0.3% of their GDP).
Short of the proper modeling tools, we have not con-
sidered some presumably non-negligible indirect im-
pacts of new climate policies on public budgets. We 
are only providing an incomplete picture of all indi-
rect impacts occurring. Although indirect impacts 
are typically second-order effects relative to direct 
impacts, our figures may probably be over- or under-
estimating true overall indirect impacts. Table 14 in 
Section 5.2 provides EU-27 and national figures for 
each of the individual effects of policies on public 
budgets including indirect ones. Results in Table 14 
are expressed as a percentage of the GDP of the cor-
responding economy.
4. Net Budget Impact of New 
Policies
In this section we add the results of our calculations 
of direct and indirect effects of policies on public rev-
enues and expenses to obtain the overall impact of the 
strengthened climate policy package on public budg-
ets in the year 2020. Following the same structure of 
the analysis carried out before, we first provide a brief 
description of the procedure followed to compute the 
Net Budget Impact (NBI) of new climate policies and 
then discuss the quantitative results. Finally, we pre-
sent results obtained when assessing the sensitivity 
of the NBI of new policies with respect to: i) the im-
pact of the decarbonization of the economy on GDP 
growth and ii) the relationship between carbon prices 
applied in the two policy scenarios considered.
4.1 Computation of the Net Impact of 
New Climate Policies on Public Budgets
We have computed the overall impact of new cli-
mate policies on public budgets by adding up all in-
dividual direct and indirect effects discussed above. 
We did not consider any revenues or expenses from 
climate policy not affecting State budgets. Thus, in-
frastructure investments and the cost of deployment 
of low-C technologies (commonly financed through 
the regulated part of energy tariffs) have been left out. 
We have also left out some effects whose size cannot 
be estimated without the use of complex simulation 
models. The main unaccounted for effect probably is 
the partial replacement of public revenues from gen-
eral (other than excise) taxes applied on fossil fuels 
by those from general taxes on investments on clean 
energy equipment and the associated infrastructure. 
We are not considering either the potential increase 
in labor intensity associated with the growth of green 
industries (see for instance Berndes and Hansson, 
2007; Lehr et al. 2008; Mathiesen et al., 2011; Dalton 
and Lewis, 2011).17
As already discussed in Section 4.2, net public reve-
nues from the application of new climate policies and 
extra costs incurred in the enhanced Policy scenario 
to abate carbon and develop new clean technologies 
must be added up to compute the change in GDP 
caused by these policies, which in turn affects State 
revenues and expenses. Hence, NBI figures presented 
in this section have been taken as an input for the 
analysis in Section 4.2.
17  Some authors state that long-term positive effects of 
the decarbonization of the system on employment critically de-
pend on the establishment of a strong export market for innova-
tive clean products (Wei et al., 2010). Furthermore, labor supply 
might increase due to the depressive effect of the implementation 
of climate policy instruments on real income. Marginal workers 
will have a higher incentive to work as a reaction to the increase 
in the price of goods (see also Pissarides, 2008).
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4.2 Numerical Results
Table 14 shows the NBI of new climate policies for the 
EU-27 as a whole and for each Member State in the 
medium carbon abatement cost future. It also includes 
figures for each of the individual effects of policies on 
the budget (both direct and indirect). Table 15 com-
pares the net impacts of these policies on public budg-
ets in the three different carbon abatement cost futures 
considered in our analysis, expressed both in monetary 
terms and as a percentage of GDP. Finally, Figure 3 
graphically represents numbers shown in Table 15. 
Changes in fossil fuel prices or the rate of develop-
ment of technologies leading to an increase in carbon 
abatement costs result in an increase in the level of 
carbon prices as well. As explained above, we have as-
sumed that the resulting increases in carbon prices 
in the Enhanced Policy and Baseline scenarios are of 
the same size. Carbon prices in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario are expected to be lower than those in the 
Baseline due to the provision in the former of further 
support to the deployment of RES and other clean 
technologies. Thus, higher carbon abatement cost 
levels lead to a higher ratio of the carbon price in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario to that in the Baseline. 
Consequently, and given that the amount of GHG 
emissions is supposed to be the same in all carbon 
abatement cost futures, extra revenues from carbon 
pricing in the Enhanced Policy scenario, and there-
fore also the NBI of new policies, is more positive the 
higher carbon abatement costs are.
At EU-27 level, the NBI of new climate policies in 
terms of GDP ranges from -0.1% for low abatement 
costs (corresponding to a decrease of 0.25% in overall 
public revenues) to 0.27% for high abatement costs 
(corresponding to an increase of 0.7% in public rev-
enues). At the country level, values of the NBI, also 
expressed in terms of the GDP of the corresponding 
country, range from -1% in the low abatement cost fu-
ture for Bulgaria and Estonia (corresponding to a de-
crease of 3% in the State revenues in these countries) 
to 1.7% of the GDP in the high carbon abatement 
cost future for Latvia (corresponding to an increase 
of almost 6% in its State revenues). The impact of new 
policies on the public budgets of main EU economies 
tends to be marginal and positive. Thus, NBI values 
Figure 3: Net Budget Impact of new policies
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Table 14: Computation of the Net Budget Impact of additional climate policies implemented in the Enhanced Policy scenario 
[medium carbon abatement costs]
Direct impact Indirect impact
NBI
Carbon pric-
ing     
Subsidies 
for RD&D 
low-C tech-
nologies 
Impact of 
GDP chang-
es on State 
revenues        
Impact of 
GDP chang-
es on State 
expenses        
Excise taxes 
on fossil 
fuels               
Subsidies 
for fossil 
fuels                        
[%GDP] [%GDP] [%GDP] [%GDP] [%GDP] [%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP]
EU-27 0.23 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 12.6 0.09
Austria 0.34 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.5 0.15
Belgium 0.30 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.5 0.13
Bulgaria -0.32 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.1 -0.38
Cyprus 0.28 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.0 0.12
Czech Republic 0.35 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.3 0.20
Denmark 0.21 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.1 0.05
Estonia -0.76 -0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.12 0.03 -0.1 -0.71
Finland 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.1 -0.07
France 0.37 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 3.5 0.16
Germany 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.2 0.01
Greece 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.0 -0.01
Hungary 0.80 -0.01 -0.23 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.6 0.51
Ireland 0.42 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.7 0.30
Italy 0.24 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.7 0.04
Latvia 1.29 -0.01 -0.24 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.2 0.97
Lithuania 0.61 -0.01 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.1 0.43
Luxembourg 0.48 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.1 0.27
Malta 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.0 -0.02
Netherlands 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.5 0.08
Poland 0.18 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.1 0.02
Portugal 0.33 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.3 0.17
Romania 0.71 -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.6 0.47
Slovak Republic 0.18 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.0 0.03
Slovenia 0.35 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.0 0.10
Spain 0.28 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 1.8 0.14
Sweden 0.21 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.2 0.05
UK 0.16 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.06 1.9 0.08
Source: Own calculation
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Table 15: Net Budget Impact of new policies [low, medium and high carbon abatement costs]
State 
 revenues
NBI
Low carbon abatement costs        Medium carbon abatement costs High carbon abatement costs       
[%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP] [bn€] [%GDP]
EU-27 39.2 -13.6 -0.10 12.6 0.09 38.7 0.27
Austria 42.8 -0.1 -0.05 0.5 0.15 1.1 0.35
Belgium 44.3 -0.2 -0.06 0.5 0.13 1.3 0.32
Bulgaria 33.3 -0.4 -1.04 -0.1 -0.38 0.1 0.27
Cyprus 39.2 0.0 -0.12 0.0 0.12 0.1 0.35
Czech Republic 36.1 -0.4 -0.28 0.3 0.20 1.0 0.67
Denmark 48.2 -0.2 -0.08 0.1 0.05 0.4 0.17
Estonia 32.2 -0.2 -1.02 -0.1 -0.71 -0.1 -0.41
Finland 43.1 -0.4 -0.19 -0.1 -0.07 0.1 0.06
France 42.8 -0.2 -0.01 3.5 0.16 7.2 0.34
Germany 39.3 -3.8 -0.14 0.2 0.01 4.2 0.16
Greece 32.6 -0.6 -0.20 0.0 -0.01 0.6 0.19
Hungary 40.4 0.0 0.03 0.6 0.51 1.1 0.99
Ireland 29.3 0.1 0.06 0.7 0.30 1.2 0.55
Italy 42.8 -2.1 -0.12 0.7 0.04 3.5 0.21
Latvia 28.9 0.0 0.22 0.2 0.97 0.3 1.72
Lithuania 30.3 0.0 -0.07 0.1 0.43 0.3 0.93
Luxembourg 35.6 0.0 0.01 0.1 0.27 0.2 0.52
Malta 34.5 0.0 -0.19 0.0 -0.02 0.0 0.16
Netherlands 39.1 -0.5 -0.08 0.5 0.08 1.5 0.24
Poland 34.3 -1.8 -0.44 0.1 0.02 1.9 0.48
Portugal 36.7 -0.1 -0.06 0.3 0.17 0.7 0.40
Romania 28.0 -0.2 -0.18 0.6 0.47 1.5 1.12
Slovak Republic 29.1 -0.2 -0.31 0.0 0.03 0.3 0.37
Slovenia 37.3 -0.1 -0.20 0.0 0.10 0.2 0.40
Spain 33.1 -0.9 -0.07 1.8 0.14 4.4 0.34
Sweden 47.1 -0.2 -0.06 0.2 0.05 0.6 0.15
UK 37.3 -1.2 -0.05 1.9 0.08 4.9 0.21
Source: Own calculation
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for these economies in terms of their GDP range from 
-0.14% for Germany in the low CAC future to 0.34% 
for France and Spain in the high CAC one. 
As already explained in Section 4.2, the overall NBI 
of climate policy is clearly dominated by revenues 
from carbon pricing (namely the trading of emis-
sion allowances in ETS sectors and the levy of car-
bon taxes in non-ETS ones). Thereby, the NBI of new 
policies is positively correlated with the level of extra 
revenues from carbon pricing in the Enhanced Pol-
icy scenario. We have also argued that extra carbon 
pricing revenues obtained in this scenario mainly 
depend on the carbon intensity of the economy, the 
share of emissions produced in non-ETS sectors, and 
the reduction in GHG emissions taking place in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to the Base-
line. The effect of these three variables on the NBI can 
be summarized as follows: The larger the carbon in-
tensity of the economy, the larger the absolute value 
of the NBI. However, the latter could be positive or 
negative. Thus, the carbon intensity of the economy 
is highly and positively correlated with the absolute 
value of the NBI. Besides, the larger the share of non-
ETS GHG emissions and the lower the reduction in 
GHG emissions in the Enhanced Policy scenario, the 
more positive the NBI. Thus, the share of non-ETS 
emissions is highly and positively correlated with the 
NBI, while the reduction in GHG emissions in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario is negatively correlated.
In countries like Bulgaria or Estonia, where the share 
of non-ETS emissions is low, the carbon intensity of 
the economy is very high and reductions in GHG 
emissions taking place in the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario are very large, the impact of new policies in the 
strengthened policy package on the NBI is very large 
and negative. When abatement costs considered are 
at a medium level, the NBI of these policies in Bul-
garia represents -0.4% of its GDP, while in Estonia it 
represents -0.7%, or about -1% and -2% of their total 
State revenues, respectively. On the other hand, those 
countries with a large share of non-ETS emissions, 
economies with relatively high carbon intensities and 
experiencing low to very low decreases in GHG emis-
sions in the Enhanced Policy scenario face very large 
and positive impacts of additional climate policies 
on the public budget. This is the case, for instance, of 
countries like Latvia or Hungary. The NBI of new cli-
mate policies in Latvia in the medium abatement cost 
future amounts to 0.97% of its GDP, or about 3.5% of 
its total State revenues, while in Hungary it represents 
0.5% of the GDP, or about 1.25% of its State revenues. 
Finally, there are other combinations of the afore-
mentioned explanatory variables also leading to large 
positive public budget impacts. This is the case of Ro-
mania, where the share of non-ETS GHGs is medium 
to low and the decrease in emissions in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario is medium to high. Despite this, car-
bon pricing revenues in this scenario are larger than 
in the Baseline when we assume medium abatement 
costs. Then, due to the fact that the carbon intensity 
of the Romanian economy is high, the NBI of climate 
policy is large and positive. When considering me-
dium carbon abatement costs, Romania experiences 
one of the biggest positive impacts of new policies on 
the public budget in the whole EU. Its budget surplus 
increases by almost 2%, or 0.46% of the country’s 
GDP. When carbon abatement costs considered are 
low, the NBI impact of new climate policies in this 
country becomes negative and also large in magni-
tude.
On the whole, countries whose budgets are more 
significantly affected by policies, either positively or 
negatively, are those whose economies have a high 
carbon intensity, which tend to be also the less de-
veloped ones (they have a more traditional industry). 
Whether their public budgets are positively or nega-
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tively affected depends mainly on the proportion of 
carbon in ETS and non-ETS industries and the size 
of the additional reduction in carbon emissions to be 
achieved through new policies. The budgets of large, 
more developed countries in the EU tend to be only 
slightly affected by new climate policies.
Differences among large EU economies can be main-
ly explained in terms of the proportion of ETS emis-
sions in them. Germany is the country whose public 
budget is most negatively affected by new policies 
because as much as 55% of local emissions there are 
expected to come from ETS sectors in the year 2020. 
NBI values for Germany range between -0.14% and 
0.16% of its GDP depending on abatement costs. On 
the other hand, France is experiencing the largest in-
crease in net public revenues because only 23% of to-
tal emissions there are produced in ETS sectors. NBI 
values for France range between -0.01% and 0.034% 
of its GDP. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section we explore how the NBI of new climate 
policies may change when considering alternative val-
ues for the main input variables to our analysis. Sec-
tion 5.3.1 is dedicated to analyzing the sensitivity of re-
sults to the GDP impact of the replacement of high-C 
products with low-C ones. Section 5.3.2 analyzes the 
sensitivity of results to the relationship between carbon 
prices applied in the two climate policy scenarios.
4.3.1 Sensitivity of Results to the GDP Impact 
of the Shift to Low-C Products
The effect that carbon emission reductions required 
to achieve 2020 objectives will have on the level of 
output of the economy has been computed in Sec-
tion 4.2. According to the arguments provided in that 
section, the resulting decrease in GDP is equal to the 
costs incurred by industries when abating these car-
bon emissions. However, estimates of GDP changes 
that are based on carbon abatement costs neglect ef-
ficiency losses that may result from the application of 
a specific set of climate policies. These policies may 
produce a suboptimal allocation of emission reduc-
tions to economic activities. In other words, eco-
nomic activities reducing their level of emissions may 
not be those where the most economical abatement 
opportunities exist. Besides, abatement costs do not 
take into account the (at least short-term) loss of 
competitiveness experienced by the economy due to 
the increase in the costs of local production resulting 
from the use of lower-C products.
On the other hand, developing and using cleaner 
technologies may also create some non-negligible 
benefits for the economy that we are not considering 
in our estimate of the GDP impact of the use of these 
technologies. Potential benefits include an increase in 
the level of security of supply in the energy system 
achieved by limiting fossil fuel import dependency. 
Additionally, using clean technologies reduces envi-
ronmental harm, which should in the future reduce 
health care and agricultural costs. The latter benefits 
will only be realized in the medium- to long-term.
Considering potential economic benefits and costs 
additional to those reflected in carbon abatement 
costs could lead to GDP impacts significantly dif-
ferent from those computed in our analysis. This is 
consistent with the estimates found in the literature 
on the GDP impact of GHG emission reductions, 
which show a large dispersion as illustrated in Annex 
I. Thus, we have estimated how the Net Budget Im-
pact of new climate policies would change if, instead 
of considering carbon abatement costs when comput-
ing the GDP impact of the shift to low-C products, 
we considered values for the latter impact in the high 
and low range of those published in the academic lit-
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erature on the subject, see Annex I. Results have been 
computed for the central (medium) carbon abate-
ment cost future (and therefore assuming medium 
carbon price levels).
Based on the literature review we have conducted, 
which is reported in Annex I, the GDP impact of 
the shift to low-C products in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario can be reasonably expected to lie between 
-0.35% and +0.15% of the EU-27 GDP for 2020. This 
results in the overall GDP impact of new policies at 
EU level range from -0.37% of the GDP to -0.03% of 
the GDP. The GDP impact initially calculated using 
carbon abatement costs amounted to -0.2% of the 
GDP. Then, State revenues from taxes would decrease 
in an amount equal to between 0.15% and 0.01% of 
the EU GDP (a decrease equaling 0.08% of the GDP 
had been obtained when considering carbon abate-
ment costs). Lastly, the NBI of new climate policies 
at EU level would range between +0.01% and +0.17% 
of the GDP, while the value initially computed corre-
sponded to 0.09% of the GDP. Table 16 provides these 
same results in a schematic way. Numbers in this ta-
ble are expressed as a percentage of the GDP.
Hence, assumptions made when estimating the im-
pact that greening the economy will have on GDP 
have a substantial effect, in relative terms, on the es-
timate of the NBI of new climate policies. However, 
the EU average net increase in State revenues from 
the application of these policies should in any case be 
positive, assuming medium CAC levels, and limited 
(probably significantly smaller than other changes in 
public budgets driven by relevant variations in main 
macroeconomic variables). 
4.3.2 Sensitivity of Results to the Relationship 
between Carbon Prices Applied in the Two Cli-
mate Policy Scenarios
Carbon pricing revenues in both scenarios have been 
computed assuming that differences among car-
bon abatement costs in the different abatement cost 
futures envisaged translate into the same nominal 
differences in carbon prices, which are therefore as-
sumed to be common to the two policy scenarios. 
This implies that the ratio of the carbon price applied 
in the Enhanced Policy scenario to that in the Base-
line increases with abatement costs. Here we assume 
instead that the proportion of the carbon price in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario to that applied in the Base-
line scenario is not affected by factors driving abate-
ment costs (i.e. fossil fuel prices and technologies 
development rates) but remains equal to that in EC 
(2009)18 (see Figure 4).
Under the new assumption on the effect of car-
bon abatement cost levels on the level of carbon 
prices in both scenarios, additional public revenues 
from carbon pricing in the EU-27 in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario are negative for all the three carbon 
18  Note that carbon prices in EC (2009) correspond to 
those we have considered in the low carbon abatement cost fu-
ture.
Table 16: Sensitivity of results for the medium CAC future to changes in the GDP impact of the shift to low-C products
GDP impact  
based on CACs
[% GDP]
Extreme low  
GDP impact
[% GDP]
Extreme high  
GDP impact
[% GDP]
GDP impact
Shift to low-C products -0.1 -0.35 +0.15
Overall impact -0.2 -0.37 -0.03
GDP impact on State revenues from taxes -0.08 -0.15 -0.01
NBI 0.09 0.01 0.17
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abatement cost futures considered. They amount to 
-€7.3bn, -€11.6bn and -€16bn for low, medium and 
high abatement costs, respectively. Hence, additional 
revenues in the Enhanced Policy scenario obtained 
from carbon taxes applied in non-ETS sectors cannot 
outweigh foregone ETS auction revenues associated 
with both GHG emission levels and carbon prices be-
ing lower than those in the Baseline scenario. 
It should, however, be highlighted that nominal car-
bon pricing revenues in both scenarios and in any of 
the futures considered are expected to increase sig-
nificantly with respect to current, i.e. 2010, levels. 
For the EU-27 as whole, they range between €50bn 
and €109bn for the Enhanced Policy scenario and be-
tween €57bn and €125bn for the Baseline.
Differences in carbon pricing revenues among Mem-
ber States are driven by the same factors as those 
identified in Section 3.1. Only those countries where 
the share of non-ETS emissions is clearly above the 
EU average (i.e. Austria, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Figure 4: Assumptions made on carbon prices applied in the two scenarios
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Table 17: Sensitivity of results for the low, medium and high CAC futures to the relationship between carbon prices applied in 
both policy scenarios
Additional Carbon Pricing  
Revenues in the Enhanced 
Policy scenario
[%GDP]
NBI
[%GDP]
Common nominal differences 
between C-prices in both sce-
narios
Low CAC -0.05 -0.10
Medium CAC 0.23 0.09
High CAC 0.52 0.27
Constant proportion of C-price 
in Enhanced Policy scenario to 
that in Baseline
Low CAC -0.05 -0.10
Medium CAC -0.08 -0.13
High CAC -0.11 -0.16
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Latvia, Luxembourg and Sweden) show positive extra 
revenues in the Enhanced Policy scenario. 
Since revenues from carbon pricing are one major 
component of the overall impact of climate poli-
cies on State budgets, changes in the carbon prices 
assumed to be applied in the two scenarios also af-
fect the net budget impact of new climate policies. 
Thus, for the set of carbon prices considered in this 
section, the NBI of these policies for the EU-27 as a 
whole is -€14bn (representing -0.1% of GDP) in the 
low CAC future, -€18bn (-0.13% of the GDP) for 
medium CACs and -€23bn (-0.16% of the GDP) for 
high CACs. Hence, considering new carbon prices, 
the net increase in public revenues resulting from the 
adoption of a more ambitious climate policy is always 
negative. However, the difference between public rev-
enues under both policy regimes is always small com-
pared to nominal revenue values. Table 17 provides 
the impact of new climate policies both on carbon 
pricing and overall net public revenues for both of 
the assumptions considered in our analysis on the re-
lationship between carbon prices applied in the Base-
line and Enhanced Policy scenarios. Numbers in this 
table are expressed as a percentage of the GDP.
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5. Conclusions
The decarbonization of the EU energy system will im-
pact the fiscal equilibrium of Member States affect-
ing both sides of a country’s budget. Understanding 
the effects of climate policies on public finances is 
of high interest in the current situation, where most 
EU economies are facing substantial public deficits. 
To our knowledge, no study has so far attempted 
to quantify those impacts. The presented analysis, 
therefore, provides a first, largely tentative, estimate 
of the medium-term, stand-alone, impact of climate 
policy measures implemented from 2009 onward on 
the public budgets of EU Member States in 2020. Ex-
isting effects include both new revenue and expense 
streams as well as changes to existing public revenues 
and expenses resulting from the impact of these new 
policy instruments on economic agents’ decisions on 
the use of resources.
The Net Budget Impact (NBI) of new policy instru-
ments is non-negligible but small compared to the 
impact of possible changes in main macroeconom-
ic variables such as GDP growth. For the EU-27 as 
a whole, additional net revenues of about €12.5bn 
(0.09% of the EU-27 GDP) can be expected if future 
carbon abatement costs, reflecting fossil fuel prices 
and the rate of development of new technologies, are 
at a medium level. Assumptions made on the level of 
carbon abatement costs greatly affect the NBI, with 
values of the latter ranging between -€13.6bn and 
€38.7bn for low and high carbon abatement costs, re-
spectively. Net public revenues increase with the level 
of carbon abatement costs in the presented modeling 
exercise.
The overall budget impact is clearly dominated by the 
additional revenues that Member States are expected 
to obtain from carbon pricing. Other relevant factors 
are the decrease in revenues associated with climate 
policy driven changes to the GDP and the decrease 
in revenues from excise taxes on fossil fuels. Differ-
ences among countries result mainly from differences 
in the carbon intensity of the economy, the share of 
emissions produced in non-ETS sectors and the ex-
tra reduction in GHG emissions achieved when new 
policies are applied: The larger the carbon intensity of 
the economy, the larger the absolute value of the NBI 
tends to be; the larger the share of non-ETS GHG 
emissions and the lower the reduction in GHG emis-
sions resulting from new policies, the more positive 
the impact will be. 
The impact of new climate policies on State budgets 
varies widely across countries. Countries most sig-
nificantly affected, both positively and negatively, are 
among the ten “new” Member States with the two 
countries most negatively affected by the application 
of new policies being Bulgaria and Estonia. These are 
the only two countries that, according to the assump-
tions made, could experience a decrease in net public 
revenues larger than 0.5% of their GDP in some of the 
scenarios considered. In fact, this decrease could be as 
high as 1% in terms of their GDP for low abatement 
costs. Both are countries with a small, highly carbon-
intensive (traditional), economy and a low GDP per 
capita, especially in the case of Bulgaria. Thus, im-
plementing the required changes in the economy of 
these countries may require external support. 
Countries whose public accounts may be most posi-
tively affected by the implementation of new climate 
policy measures in any scenario are Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania. These could experience an 
increase in their net public revenues at or above 1% 
of their GDP for high carbon abatement costs. The 
economies of these countries are also carbon-inten-
sive and their GDP per capita is low. Thus, extra pub-
lic revenues in these countries should be employed 
to fuel their economic growth instead of supporting 
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“losers” in the decarbonization process. 
However, the impact of new climate policy instru-
ments on large EU economies is expected to be small, 
generally positive, and in line with average EU val-
ues. Therefore, authorities may consider the option of 
sharing among all EU countries, taking into account 
their economic strength, the economic burden that 
the transition to a low-C economy may represent for 
those most negatively affected.
The absolute level of the budget impact of new cli-
mate policies in the Enhanced Policy scenario is quite 
sensitive to assumptions made within this analysis 
concerning the value of main input variables. NBI 
values computed at the EU-27 level for medium car-
bon abatement costs range from +0.01% to +0.17% in 
terms of GDP depending on the underlying assump-
tion concerning the impact of moving to a lower-C 
economy on GDP. Besides, changing the assumptions 
made regarding the effect that the application of new 
policies will have on carbon prices may lead to the 
estimate of the NBI for the EU-27 changing its sign. 
However, our analysis has allowed us to determine 
the order of magnitude of the main effects of new cli-
mate policies on public budgets. Besides, relative dif-
ferences among countries in the impact of new poli-
cies on their net public revenues seem to be far more 
robust than the nominal level of this impact in each 
country. 
New climate policies have to be financed in a con-
text in which substantial budget adjustments will 
be necessary to correct large short-term deficits and 
avoid an explosion of debt in the long-term. Public 
finance variables like the fragility of State budgets, 
the level of fiscal pressure and the expected growth of 
economies may affect the implementation of climate 
policies. The higher the financial fragility of a coun-
try, the more difficult the implementation of expen-
sive climate policies may be, while strong expected 
growth rates could provide more room for the latter. 
However, closely assessing the effect of general public 
finances on climate policies is out of the scope of our 
analysis and must be left for future work.
Though we are well aware that the methodology that 
we have applied has obvious limitations, we have been 
able to provide a first quantitative idea of the impact 
that the climate and energy policy package introduced 
by the EU in 2009 will have on Member States’ pub-
lic budgets in 2020. Figures put forward may provide 
useful indications to national governments as to the 
repercussion of the policy package for their own pub-
lic accounts and their management. They may also 
assist the European Commission in the fine tuning 
of climate and energy policies. The obvious develop-
ments of the analysis provided herein would consist 
of conducting a full set of simulations using a com-
plex computable general equilibrium model where 
all the direct and indirect effects of climate policies 
could take place and their ultimate impact on public 
budgets could be traced through the inter-sectoral in-
terdependencies within economies.
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Annexes
Annex I: Studies Estimating the Closed 
Loop Impact of Climate Policies on GDP
Mitigating climate change, i.e. reaching a stabilization 
of GHG at a level of 500 to 550ppm, is expected to 
be feasible at a cost level of about 1% of global GDP 
in 2050 (with average estimates typically lower for 
2020). Therefore, GDP impacts are not negligible, 
but “they are also not high enough seriously to com-
promise the world’s future standard of living” (Stern, 
2006, p. 240).19 
Estimates vary strongly by analysis and scenario de-
pending on the underlying assumptions made and 
the modeling approaches used (see Barker et al., 
2006 for an in-depth meta-analysis). It can be ex-
pected that the impact on the global – or regional/
national – GDP will be lower for i) high technology 
development rates resulting from technology innova-
tions and learning-by-doing; ii) high future fossil fuel 
prices; iii) high flexibility in abatement between sec-
tors, technologies and GHGs; and last but not least iv) 
high productivity increases from revenue recycling. 
See Table 18 for a summary of selected studies.
Annex II: Computation of Off-Budget 
Components
Support to clean technology deployment
For an in-depth overview of clean technology deploy-
ment support instruments by EU Member States and 
technology see CEER (2011). The level of subsidies 
19  Various other studies conclude similarly that climate 
change mitigation is affordable (e.g. CCC, 2008; Busch, 2009; 
Strachan and Kannan, 2008; Lu et al., 2010). Barker et al. (2006) 
– providing a meta-analysis of the costs of mitigating climate 
change – similarly conclude that “the overall conclusion from the 
modeling literature is that even stringent stabilization targets can 
be met without materially affecting world GDP growth, at low 
carbon tax rates or permit prices, at least by 2030.”
provided to immature technologies could be roughly 
estimated as the extra cost of their deployment com-
pared to the use of alternative, cost-competitive tech-
nologies. Following this reasoning, we estimate the 
extra amount of deployment subsidies in the more 
ambitious Enhanced Policy scenario as the increase 
in system costs resulting from the use of new clean 
technologies.
In EC (2007) the extra amount of emissions abated 
with respect to a business-as-usual case reported in EC 
(2007b) is discussed and the extra system cost per unit 
of emissions abated that would result from the use of 
new clean energy technologies up to their economic 
potential. Using this information, we have computed 
the extra cost for the EU-27 resulting from the use of 
each technology in 2020 as the extra cost per unit of 
CO2 abated using each technology times the annual 
amount of emissions avoided at that horizon. 
To compute the amount of subsidies to be provided 
to each technology, we have subtracted from the extra 
system cost associated with the use of this technology 
the cost in the market of the extra carbon emissions 
that for higher-C technologies replaced by the former 
would otherwise have to be paid. The price of the cor-
responding emission allowances would have to be paid 
by technologies replaced, which are assumed to be of 
the same type as the ones at the margin. Hence, high-
er-C technologies enter the market at the sum of both 
production cost and the carbon price. The gap between 
this sum and the cost of new clean technologies would 
need to be covered through support payments.
The increase in the use of clean technologies up to 
their economic potential, which is the level of use con-
sidered in EC (2007), is much larger than that taking 
place in the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to 
our Baseline. Thus, we have scaled down the estimate 
of extra system costs associated with the use of each 
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Table 18: Studies investigating the impact of climate policies on GDP
Study Climate policy restrictions Estimates on GDP impact Sensitivities and comments
Stern (2006)
Global scale
550ppm stabilization 2050: - 1% of GDP with a range of +1 
to -3.5%
2025: -0.7% (-0.2 to -1.1%)
Costs lower with 
* Optimistic technology case
* High future oil/gas prices
Stern (2006) 
[literature review]
500-550ppm stabilization Expected impact of -1% of GDP by 
2050 with a range of +/-3%
Models differ in:
* Assumed BAU level
* Technological change
* Flexibility between sectors/ technolo-
gies/ GHG gases and about where to 
abate
* When abatement takes place
ECF (2010)
EU-27
Decarbonization (80% GHG reduction in EU-27 com-
pared to 1990 by 2050) compared to BAU with different 
RES scenarios (40, 60, 80%)
Baseline: 
* Overall GDP: assumed to grow from €10 to 22 trillion 
* GHG emissions: decreased by about 10% during last 
decade, assumed to stay relatively flat until 2050
* Climate policies: status quo remains (enhanced ETS, 
20-20-20 policy package, incl. significant energy effi-
ciency improvements; transportation efficiency targets; 
some CCS pilot projects 
1// Direct GDP effect: negligible 
(Difference in annual growth rates 
between the two scenarios less than 
0.05% points p.a. à given uncertain-
ties in 40-year projection this is not 
significant)
2020: zero
2050: +0.5 to +1%
2// Technology developments may 
have sustainable positive impact of 
+0.5 to +1% 
* No material difference in macro-
economic impact across different RES 
scenarios (40%, 60%, 80%)
* Doubling of fossil fuel prices will 
cause a growth of GDP impact of 
between 0.3 and 0.5% by 2050
* Exports of clean technologies add 
~€250 bn to GDP in 2010-2020 period
Strachan and Kannan 
(2008)
UK
60% reduction by 2050 Three energy price scenarios (central, 
low, high) à impact of -0.3 to -1.5% 
of GDP in 2050
Prior to 2030: slight GDP gains (CO
2
 
constraint only imposed in 2030)
This cost range comparable to zero to 
2.5% of global GDP for 550ppm target 
CCC (2008)
UK
Reduction GHG emissions by 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050
Resource cost modeling: impact of 
-0.28% of GDP in 2020
Macroeconomic model: GDP impact 
of -0.82% in 2020 
CGE: impact of -0.25% of GDP in 2020
Model 2 does not include any auto-
matic mechanism for the economy to 
return to full resource use and there-
fore might include transitional effects
High fossil fuel price scenario reduces 
GDP impact
Contaldi et al. (2007)
Italy
BAU scenario with respect to RES vs. green certificate 
scenario, where there is an increase of RES obligation 
for producers up to 2020 to reach share of 7% in 2020
Moderate impact on GDP of -0.05% 
p.a.
Busch (2009)
US
Reduction scenarios:
i) 80% below 1990 level by 2050 (= cumulative emission 
allowance to 2050 of 167 Gt)
ii) Emissions capped at 2008 level (287 Gt) 
Results from four modeling exercises 
for 2020:
Average impact 167Gt scenario: -2% 
from BAU GDP
Average impact 287Gt scenario: 
-0.19%
Models focus on costs (savings due 
to improved efficiency; only benefit 
component)
Busch (2009)
California
Return to 1990 levels by 2020 (legally binding) 2020: Impact on GDP for three dif-
ferent CGE models between +0.15% 
and -1.4%
All three models reach target, dif-
ference in how is unclear from this 
meta-analysis
Lu et al. (2010)
China
Impact of carbon tax (different levels, different recy-
cling mechanisms)
2050 perspective
1// Different levels of carbon tax: GDP 
impact between -0.19% (~€5/t) and 
-1.1% (€33/t)
2// Case of ~€22/t
BAU: -0.74%
Recycling to industry: -0.71%
Recycling to HH: -0.67%
Revenue recycling decreases the nega-
tive effect on GDP
Barker et al. (2006)
Meta-analysis
Typically global 
models
Stabilizing CO
2
 concentrations at 450, 500 and 550ppm 
levels
Global impact to 2100:
450: average -3.1% GDP change from 
baseline (range: -27.6 to +4%)
500: av. -0.9% (-15.8 to +4%)
550: av. -0.5% (-7.5 to 2.1%)
Reasons for differences in outcomes 
lie in assumptions and modeling ap-
proaches 
Results from meta-analysis:
- Adoption of static CGE models: GDP becomes 0.8% larger with respect to 
average analysis 
- Use of Kyoto mechanism (modeling of international trade in emission permits): 
GDP becomes 0.9% larger w.r.t. average analysis
- Introduction of backstop technology (unlimited substitution at high enough 
carbon prices): 0.5% larger than average analysis
- Allowing for climate change benefits (these are monetized and discounted): 
0.5% larger than average analysis
- Allowing for non-climate benefits: 1% larger than average analysis
- Introduction of ITC: 2% larger than average analysis
- Recycling of additional revenues: 3.3% larger than average analysis
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clean technology in EC (2007) to match the increase 
in the use of clean technologies necessary to meet 2020 
objectives under the Enhanced Policy scenario.
Table 19 illustrates the process we have followed to 
determine the extra amount of required support 
payments to clean technologies. For each new clean 
technology it provides the extra system cost per unit 
of carbon abated, the amount of carbon emissions 
avoided, and the overall amount of support payments 
to be provided if the respective technology would be 
used up to its economic potential. We provide the 
nominal level of support payments estimated to be 
provided in 2020 in the Baseline scenario as well as 
the additional support payments needed in the En-
hanced Policy scenario based on changes in the in-
stalled capacity.20 The overall amount of extra support 
payments expected to be necessary is about €4.2bn. 
The overall amount of extra subsidies has been allo-
cated to Member States proportionally to the increase 
in their use of the different technologies expected to 
take place in the Enhanced Policy scenario in 2020 
(see Table 20).
20  Only supply side technologies and networks have been 
considered because major clean demand-side technologies (en-
ergy efficiency) are either already cost competitive by 2020 or are 
not mature enough to be deployed according to projections in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario. 
Table 19: Calculation of additional subsidies to the deployment of low-C technologies
 Basis for calculation of extra system cost (based on EC, 2007)
Baseline scenario 
in 2020
Difference 
Enhanced Policy scenario 
Baseline in 2020
 
Extra cost of 
abatement
Extra amount of 
emissions avoided   
Change in capacity as-
sumed
Subsidies 
required
Use of tech-
nology
Subsidies 
required
Capacity 
difference 
Extra subsidies 
required   
 [€/t CO
2
] [Mt CO
2
]  [M€] [GW installed] [M€]  [M€]
Wind -5 0  to 100 120 GW à 120-180 - 172.3 - 172.3 GW à222.1 -
PV 240 30 to 60 9 GW à 65-125 9,900 38.9 4,376 38.9 GW à 48.64 
(total solar)
1,121
CSP 15 to 55 5 to 35 0 GW à 1.8 300 1.8 200 1.8 GW à 1.8 -
Solar heat/cooling 270 to 330 4 to 30 52 GWth à 90-320 4,760 69.2 2,115 No reference 539
Large hydro 25 3.5 to 15 100 GW à 101-108 45 113.4 -
113.4 GW à 114.2 
(both large and 
small)
5.8
Small hydro 5 to 10 0.5 to 7.5 14.5 GW à 14.5-18 - - - Increase of 0.224 GW 0
Geothermal 0 to 100 15 to 35 1 GWe à 1-6 750 0.82 205 0.82 GW à 1.4 174
Ocean wave 70 to 150 10 to 15 0.9 GWe à 5-10 1125 1.64 264 1.64 GW à 3.62 338
CHP 15 to 30 50 to 85 160 GWe à 165-185 169 132.5 -
71.98 Mtoe 
(heat),17.6% elec-
tricity from CHP à 
72.88 Mtoe & 18.4% 
67.8
Zero emission fossil 
fuel power plants
30 20 to 120 0 GWe à 5-30 700 10.5 2101 No change -
Nuclear fission -5 55 to 160 114 GWe  à 127-150 - 123.6 - 123.6 GW à 123.3 -
Nuclear fusion N.A. N.A. N.A. - - - - -
Electricity networks N.A. 20 to 30 1% less losses N.A. N.A. - 459 TWh à 443 
(losses)
N.A.
Bio-fuels 150 to 160 15 to 40  24 Mtoe à32-45 3,713 22 5,438 22 Mtoe à 29.6 1,953
H2/FC (only pas-
senger cars)
475 5 0 à 1.5% 2,275 - - - -
Total subsidies - - - 23,736 - 12,809 - 4,198
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Energy infrastructure investments
Changes to required infrastructure investments may 
represent a non-negligible part of the impact on of the 
implementation of climate policies on the economy. 
Large upgrades of electricity transmission grids are 
deemed to be necessary to cope with very high pene-
tration levels of RES. The impact on distribution costs 
is deemed to be mixed, since infrastructure invest-
ments required to make the grid smarter are substan-
tial but the installation of large shares of distributed 
generation (DG) and the activation of demand could 
contribute to locally balancing demand and genera-
tion and thus avoid investments in lines and trans-
formers. Distribution infrastructure requirements are 
in any case deemed to depend much on the specific 
features of the area considered and the regulation in 
place affecting the development of the grid. Finally, 
investments in gas infrastructures are expected to de-
crease as a consequence of the expected reduction in 
the demand for natural gas.
According to most analyses and in line with current 
practices in most systems, energy infrastructure in-
Table 20: Additional deployment subsidies in the Enhanced Policy scenario compared to the Baseline 
[M€] PV Solar heating/cooling Hydro Geothermal  Ocean CHP Biofuels   Total
Baseline Increase Base Incr. Base Incr. Base Incr. Base Incr. Base Incr. Base Incr. Base Incr. % GDP
EU-27 4,376 1,121 2,115 539 - 5.76 205 174 264 338 200 68 5,438 1,953 12,809 4,198 0.030
Austria 28.28 1.21 296.07 16.26 - 0.567 0.22 0.25 - - 1.29 134.15 126.23 24.64 452.10 177.08 0.057
Belgium 18.35 2.69 20.51 3.86 - - - - - - 0.84 -48.25 140.31 78.54 180.00 36.83 0.009
Bulgaria 5.54 1.68 2.26 0.88 - - 0.18 1.03 - - 0.25 97.19 14.08 18.48 22.32 119.27 0.344
Cyprus 9.27 2.69 60.01 22.35 - - - - - - 0.42 0.34 4.45 3.08 74.15 28.47 0.127
Czech R. 21.79 0.00 11.67 0.00 - - - - - - 1.00 20.19 114.62 34.14 149.07 54.33 0.035
Denmark 5.45 3.03 33.97 24.22 - 0.005 - - - - 0.25 -62.63 77.81 17.71 117.48 -17.66 -0.007
Estonia 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.13 - 0.005 - - - - 0.01 -7.53 8.40 3.08 8.74 -4.18 -0.027
Finland 7.17 0.40 2.71 0.20 - 0.518 - - - - 0.33 206.02 54.59 25.92 64.80 233.06 0.116
France 471.45 60.78 139.38 23.04 - - 15.36 18.29 62.71 32.71 21.55 109.51 744.55 220.47 1454.99 464.79 0.022
Germany 1,741.90 261.89 826.88 159.42 - - 14.34 14.78 - - - -317.92 1137.82 251.27 3748.31 369.43 0.014
Greece 171.51 60.44 289.03 130.61 - 0.295 1.51 3.71 - - 7.84 -11.29 81.52 53.64 551.41 237.41 0.082
Hungary 7.36 0.00 4.14 0.00 - - 2.47 1.36 - - 0.34 30.46 76.58 19.51 90.88 51.32 0.045
Ireland 2.29 0.34 5.68 1.07 - - 3.88 5.73 16.08 26.41 0.10 5.82 60.28 44.91 88.30 84.27 0.038
Italy 578.85 57.75 110.15 14.09 - - 115.27 21.98 - - 26.45 -255.64 635.11 256.65 1484.71 94.84 0.006
Latvia 0.76 0.13 0.51 0.12 - - - - - - 0.03 18.14 16.55 3.85 17.86 22.24 0.128
Lithuania 1.43 1.62 0.31 0.45 - - - - - - 0.07 8.21 20.01 6.67 21.82 16.95 0.056
Luxembourg 6.88 0.47 1.61 0.14 - - - - - - 0.31 -10.61 40.27 17.71 49.07 7.71 0.016
Malta 4.97 0.34 2.54 0.22 - - - - - - 0.23 - 0.74 1.03 8.48 1.58 0.023
Netherlands 11.85 1.68 52.56 9.57 - - 2.11 1.55 0.32 3.24 0.54 -110.54 149.45 61.60 242.20 -32.90 -0.005
Poland 0.96 0.54 26.60 19.22 - - - 2.62 - - 0.04 811.75 232.95 117.03 286.74 951.17 0.234
Portugal 149.25 146.12 26.45 33.20 - 0.356 8.55 5.96 18.01 26.41 6.82 -44.49 83.00 25.15 292.08 192.71 0.107
Romania 11.08 2.62 5.56 1.69 - - 0.52 0.52 - - 0.51 -137.23 41.75 20.28 59.42 -112.13 -0.083
Slovak R. 2.87 0.00 8.01 0.00 - - - 1.15 - - 0.13 25.67 31.62 22.59 42.63 49.40 0.067
Slovenia 4.59 0.00 9.16 0.00 - 0.204 - 0.59 - - 0.21 -29.09 42.74 23.36 56.70 -4.94 -0.011
Spain 1,087.47 513.22 122.60 74.19 - 0.722 0.02 40.59 - 0.17 129.30 -79.05 748.25 228.17 2102.00 778.01 0.061
Sweden 7.26 0.40 28.45 2.03 - 2.770 - - - - 0.33 -381.58 125.98 35.42 162.03 -340.96 -0.090
UK 17.49 1.08 27.67 2.18 - 0.322 40.58 53.92 166.9 248.57 0.80 96.16 628.20 338.27 980.24 740.51 0.031
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vestments should probably be financed mainly by 
energy consumers through electricity and gas tariffs. 
Besides, there are already plans for the EU to fund a 
fraction of strategic infrastructures contributing to the 
integration of different regions in Europe and that of 
large amounts of RES generation. Hence, the fraction 
of total new infrastructure requirements expected to 
be afforded using national public funds is deemed to 
be quite low. As a consequence, we have decided not to 
consider infrastructure costs in the computation of the 
impact of climate policy on State budgets.
In this section we provide an estimate of the ad-
ditional energy infrastructure requirements in the 
Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to the Base-
line. This represents the largest expense that the State 
would have to face in the unlikely case that it became 
a major funding contributor to the development of 
energy networks. 
Table 21: Additional infrastructure cost in 2020 [Enhanced Policy - Baseline scenario]
Electricity transmission
Electricity  
distribution Gas infrastructure [M€ p.a.] Off-shore Interconnection Back-up  generation Total
EU-27 786.1 1,087.3 1,683.7 3,557.1 376.15 -522.04
Austria - 28.2 - 28.2 4.95 -20.82
Belgium 22 23.5 107.5 153 7.33 -20.58
Bulgaria 14.6 - - 14.6 2.92 -3.21
Cyprus 9.8 - - 9.8 0.24 0.00
Czech R. - 4.7 35.8 40.5 1.01 -6.83
Denmark 19.5 32.9 71.6 124.1 5.75 -4.43
Estonia 12.2 14.1 - 26.3 1.77 -0.54
Finland 17.1 89.4 35.8 142.3 11.02 -5.77
France 100.1 136.5 143.3 379.9 34.99 -88.09
Germany 105 108.3 322.4 535.6 75.14 -81.23
Greece 14.6 18.8 - 33.5 11.28 -10.85
Hungary - 18.8 71.6 90.5 1.89 -10.01
Ireland 12.2 9.4 - 21.6 8.56 -11.97
Italy 26.9 70.6 - 97.5 57.00 -72.91
Latvia - - - - 0.63 -4.80
Lithuania - 28.2 - 28.2 0.77 -4.04
Luxembourg - 4.7 - 4.7 0.30 -1.05
Malta 7.3 - - 7.3 -0.02 -0.01
Netherlands 39.1 108.3 71.6 219 5.59 -15.24
Poland 17.1 9.4 35.8 62.3 6.58 -10.78
Portugal 12.2 18.8 - 31 9.07 -12.39
Romania 17.1 - - 17.1 2.18 -7.66
Slovak R. - 9.4 35.8 45.2 1.64 -4.10
Slovenia - 14.1 - 14.1 1.52 -1.69
Spain 39.1 75.3 - 114.4 41.14 -57.41
Sweden 14.6 113 107.5 235.1 17.10 -5.37
UK 285.6 150.6 644.8 1,081.1 65.82 -60.23
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Table 21 provides an estimate of the extra main en-
ergy network infrastructure costs deemed to be in-
curred in the Enhanced Policy scenario. Increases in 
electricity transmission costs are much larger than 
those in electricity distribution or decreases in gas 
transmission. Overall, the former amounts to about 
€3.5bn annually at the EU level, while the latter two 
are expected to almost cancel out, each being small-
er than €500M. The most important infrastructure 
needs in electricity transmission are in the UK (al-
most one third of the total for Europe) and, at some 
distance, Germany and France (€535M and €380M, 
respectively). This has to do with the installation of 
large amounts of RES in these countries, which will 
be associated with large infrastructure investments, 
as in the case of the UK, where a large part of the RES 
generation installed will be off-shore wind that needs 
to be connected to the main grid on-shore.
Estimates of unit electricity transmission infrastructure 
needs per unit of RES installed and gas transmission in-
frastructure per unit of gas demand have been computed 
from information published in CE (2010), while those 
of unit electricity distribution infrastructure costs per 
unit of DG installed have been obtained from Comillas 
(2010). Increases in RES generation and gas demand in 
the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect to the Baseline, 
which have been employed to scale up unit costs previ-
ously computed, have been obtained from EC (2009).
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Annex III: Graphical Representation of 
the Individual Impacts
This Annex includes a graphical representation of 
results obtained for all individual impacts of new 
climate policies on public budgets distinguishing 
between the low, medium and high abatement cost 
futures whenever the three of them have been con-
sidered. 
Figure 6: Impact on GDP
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Figure 5: Revenues from carbon pricing
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Figure 7: Change in general tax revenues from climate policy driven changes to the GDP
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Figure 8: Change in general State expenses from climate policy driven by changes to the GDP
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6. 7. 
Figure 9: Changes in subsidies for fossil fuels
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Figure 10: Changes in fossil fuel excise tax revenues
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Annex IV: Data Sources and Main As-
sumptions
This Annex presents a detailed list of the sources of 
data we have used to carry out our analysis. A de-
scription of main assumptions made is also provided. 
Table 22: Data sources used within the impact assessment
Component Data sources Main assumptions
Carbon pricing GHG emissions in ETS and non-ETS sectors: EC (2009)
Carbon price levels in the Baseline and Enhanced Policy 
scenarios of the low-price storyline: EC (2009)
Carbon price levels for medium- and high-abatement cost 
storylines: Own calculation based on literature review and 
assumptions
National VAT rates: Excise duties table EC
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
In 2020, auctioning of 100% of allowances for the elec-
tricity sector and 70% for other ETS sectors.
Carbon pricing only in ETS for Baseline vs. unique carbon 
price (i.e. allowance price ETS = carbon tax applied in 
non-ETS sectors) for Enhanced Policy scenario.
Standard VAT rate applies to auctioning revenues as well 
as on top of carbon tax.
Differences among carbon prices in the different futures 
are the same as those among carbon abatement costs.
Subsidies clean 
technology deploy-
ment
Extra system cost per unit of emissions abated using low-C 
technologies up to their economic potential: EC (2007)
Change in technology use between Baseline and Enhanced 
Policy scenario: EC (2009)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Estimate of extra system cost has been scaled down 
according to expected additional employment of the 
different technologies in Enhanced Policy scenario as 
compared to Baseline.
Allocation of overall EU-wide extra amount of subsidies 
to MSs proportional to local increase in the use of the 
respective technologies. 
Subsidies clean 
technology RD&D
Innovation financing needs over the next decade to realize 
SET-Plan goals: EC (2009d)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Private share in RD&D investments likely to decrease.
Any policy scenario aimed at achieving 2020 objectives 
should also pave path for 2050.
Public sector contributions to RD&D proportional to 
their GDP. 
Change in GDP Average unit carbon abatement costs for extra amounts of 
carbon abated in the Enhanced Policy scenario with respect 
to Baseline: Various sources from literature
GHG emissions in ETS and non-ETS sectors: EC (2009)
National carbon intensities in 2020 Enhanced Policy sce-
nario: EC (2009)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Isolated effect of climate policies on the budget; no 
revenue recycling considered.
Three major components: i) substitution of high-C prod-
ucts with low-C ones; ii) funds drawn from or injected 
into the economy through climate policy; iii) public 
expenses on clean innovation.
Clustering of carbon abatement cost levels in countries 
into 3 groups according to economies’ carbon intensity.
Change in State rev-
enues and expenses 
resulting from 
changes to GDP
National levels of fiscal pressure: EC (2010b), Taxation Trends 
in EC (2005)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
State revenue and expense elasticities taken from EC (2006)
Fiscal pressure equal for both scenario and not differing 
from current levels.
Elasticities of tax revenues and State expenses with 
respect to GDP assumed to be those applicable to the 
GDP gap. 
Subsidies paid for 
production of fossil 
fuels (on-budget)
Overall amount of subsidies to the production of fossil fuels 
in the EU in the year 2001: EEA (2004)
Fossil fuel production: EC (2009), PRIMES model; IEA (2010)
Subsidies for the coal sector: GTAP7.1 database, EEA (2004)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Overall fossil fuel production subsidies in 2001 (most re-
cent data) have been distributed proportionally to level 
of coal subsidies reported in GTAP database.
Changes in state expenses proportional to changes in 
the fossil fuel production.
Subsidies for con-
sumption of fossil 
fuels (off-budget 
through reduced 
VAT)
Fossil fuel consumption: EC (2009), PRIMES model
Subsidies for fossil fuel consumption: EEA (2004), IEEP (2007)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Overall consumption subsidies proportional to those 
corresponding to the application of reduced VAT to 
household consumption. 
Changes in state expenses proportional to changes in 
fossil fuel consumption.
Excise tax revenues 
from fossil fuels
Fossil fuel consumption levels in each scenario: EC (2009), 
PRIMES model
State revenues from taxes on fossil fuel consumption: EC 
(2010)
GDP in 2020: EC (2009)
Implicit tax rates in 2020 kept constant (equal to the 
values of 2008).
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Annex V: Analytical Setting
In this annex, we outline the reasoning and assump-
tions behind this analysis, its structure and the sourc-
es of data employed. Our analysis aims to estimate the 
impact on public budgets in the year 2020 of those cli-
mate policy instruments whose implementation was 
decided from the year 2009 on. We do this by com-
paring public revenues and expenses in a Baseline 
scenario with those in a more ambitious Enhanced 
Policy scenario where 2020 policy objectives are met.
The remainder of the annex is structured as follows. 
First, we describe in detail the two climate policy sce-
narios (as reported in EC, 2009) and the set of possi-
ble future situations that we are considering. Second, 
we describe the different effects of climate policy on 
State budgets. Finally, we explain the main features 
of the process followed to compute numerical results.
A) Description of policy scenarios and carbon 
abatement cost futures
The Baseline scenario takes into account the strength-
ened ETS and legislation related to energy efficiency 
in place in April 2009. In the Enhanced Policy sce-
nario both targets for GHG and RES in 2020 are met 
through the implementation of additional measures, 
namely carbon pricing in non-ETS sectors and fur-
ther efficiency regulations.
State revenues and expenses in both scenarios are in-
fluenced by factors not closely related to climate poli-
cies and whose future evolution is highly uncertain. 
Among the main conditioning factors are fossil fuel 
prices and the rate of development of clean technolo-
gies. Therefore, instead of computing a single value for 
State revenues and expenses in each of the two policy 
scenarios considered, we have computed a range of 
values aimed to be representative of different combi-
nations of non-climate-policy related conditioning 
factors. Three different futures have been considered. 
 “Baseline” policy scenario
The Baseline scenario takes into account those cli-
mate policies whose implementation was decided be-
fore April 2009. These include:
– The revised and strengthened ETS (Directive 
2009/29/EC) allowing for a total CDM amount of 
1,600 Mt.
– The full implementation of the 2nd Internal Mar-
ket Package by 2010 and of the 3rd Package by 2015 
concerning the creation of a fully liberalized market 
regime for electricity and gas. 
– Legislation on energy efficiency including dif-
ferent eco-design implementation measures (being 
gradually applied up to their full implementation in 
2030), the Labeling Directive 2003/66/EC, Directive 
2006/32/EC on end-use energy efficiency and servic-
es and the Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC. 
– Different pieces of legislation addressing aspects 
of energy markets and power generation (e.g. Direc-
tive 2001/80/EC on large combustion plants), energy 
taxation, or the transportation sector (e.g. Regulation 
2009/443/EC on CO2 emissions from cars; or the Bio-
fuels Directive 2003/30/EC – with targets typically to 
be achieved gradually). 
Other measures included relate to the support for the 
deployment of clean technologies, mainly national 
measures addressing RES such as feed-in tariffs, 
quota systems, green certificates, subsidies or cost 
incentives in other forms. National decisions on nu-
clear phase out are taken into account.21 Direct public 
21  Nuclear investments are possible in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, France, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, 
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financial support of CCS demonstration facilities22, 
off-shore wind and clean R&D in low-C technologies 
have been considered as well. Infrastructure projects 
under TEN-E23 are supposed to be undertaken. The 
ETS has been modeled such that emissions in these 
sectors – benefiting from the maximum allowed 
amount of CDM credits – meet the cumulative emis-
sion cap over the period 2008-2030. 
“Enhanced Policy” scenario
The Enhanced Policy scenario includes additional 
instruments which have been adopted from 2009 on 
and shall result in the achievement of 2020 legally 
binding targets on overall GHG emission reductions 
and RES deployment. These include:
– Additional energy efficiency legislation, namely 
four eco-design regulations, a recast of the Energy 
Performance and Buildings Directive 2010/31/EU 
and regulations on labeling;
– Directive 2009/28/EC mandating the achievement 
of the 20% RES share in gross final energy consump-
tion target including the sub-target of a 10% RES share 
in transport fuels. Some flexibility among Member 
States in achieving RES targets is allowed;
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The following plans on new nuclear 
capacities have been considered: Bulgaria (1 GW by 2020 and 
2025 each), Finland (1.6 GW 2015), France (1.6 GW by 2015 and 
2020 each), Lithuania (800 MW by 2020 and 2025 each), Roma-
nia (706 MW by 2010, 2020 and 2025), Slovakia (880 MW 2015).
22  Th e following CCS facilities have been taken into con-
sideration: Germany 950 MW (450MW coal post-combustion, 
200MW lignite post-combustion and 300MW lignite oxy-fuel), 
Italy 660 MW (coal post-combustion), Netherlands 1460 MW 
(800MW coal post-combustion, 660MW coal integrated gasifica-
tion pre-combustion), Spain 500 MW (coal oxy-fuel), UK 3400 
MW (1600MW coal post-combustion, 1800MW coal integrated 
gasification pre-combustion), Poland 896 MW (306MW coal 
post-combustion, 590MW lignite post-combustion).
23  See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/
ten_e_en.htm for more information on Trans-European energy 
networks (TEN-E).
– Decision 2009/406/EC on the sharing of efforts 
in GHG reduction is included. Hence, the 20% GHG 
reductions target is met via the full implementation 
of ETS provisions (as in the baseline) as well as by 
reaching national non-ETS targets.
We have considered carbon pricing measures applied 
in both scenarios as being additional to existing taxes 
on fossil fuels. 
Carbon abatement cost futures
The future evolution of several factors conditioning 
the impact of climate policies on public budgets is un-
certain. These include fossil fuel prices and the rate of 
clean technology development. We assumed that the 
level of these factors is reflected in the cost of abating 
carbon. Three possible futures for carbon abatement 
costs, namely “low-”, “high-”, and “medium carbon 
abatement cost” futures, have been defined.
The level of carbon abatement costs is related to the 
amount of funds to be transferred between low- and 
high-C technologies. Carbon prices together with 
other support policies aim to close the gap between 
the net market profits of high-C and low-C products 
and services. The net market profit of a product is the 
difference between its market value and the cost of 
producing it. Carbon prices and other support poli-
cies compensate market agents for the costs incurred 
when abating carbon, thus, encouraging them to use 
clean technologies. 
We have assumed that changes in carbon abatement 
costs among the different future situations consid-
ered affect carbon prices but not the level of public 
support payments. The application of carbon prices 
improves the competitive position of clean technolo-
gies regardless of their maturity and proportionality 
to their level of emissions. Thus, they are suitable to 
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close the cost gap between the most economic clean 
technologies and the high-C cost-competitive alter-
natives. This gap depends on the rate of development 
of clean technologies, which we have deemed to be 
common to all of them, and the price of fossil fuels, 
which conditions the cost of high-C technologies. 
Therefore, underlying factors affecting the evolution 
of carbon prices are the same as those driving differ-
ences in carbon abatement costs.
Support payments to clean technologies are aimed at 
encouraging the use of less mature clean technologies 
by closing the cost gap between these and more ma-
ture clean alternatives. If we assume a common rate of 
development for all clean technologies, the cost gap 
between clean technologies within the same activity 
should generally not be significantly affected by main 
factors characterizing the futures considered (fossil 
fuel prices, technology evolution rate). There may be 
some degree of substitutability between clean tech-
nologies used in different activities, but we cannot 
take it into account within our analysis.
Furthermore, we assume that nominal changes in 
carbon prices among the different abatement cost 
futures are the same for both scenarios. This is co-
herent with assuming a common rate of development 
for the most efficient clean technologies employed in 
both policy scenarios and another rate common to all 
high-C technologies in both scenarios as well. It also 
implies that changes in fossil fuel prices must affect 
equally the cost of all high-C technologies per unit of 
carbon emissions produced. 
Based on these assumptions, we have jointly estimat-
ed the values of carbon abatement costs and carbon 
prices in the two scenarios for each of the three con-
sidered carbon abatement cost futures. Therefore, not 
only carbon abatement costs, but also carbon prices 
have been considered as input for our analysis. Strong 
simplifying assumptions about the relationship be-
tween changes in carbon abatement costs and those 
in carbon prices have been made since it was out of 
the scope of this study to simulate the functioning of 
the economy for the two scenarios in the different 
futures. A description of the three carbon abatement 
cost futures considered and the corresponding car-
bon abatement costs and carbon prices follows:
1. Low carbon abatement cost future: High fossil fuel 
prices and rates of development of clean tech-
nologies lead to a small difference between the 
net market benefits produced by high- and low-C 
products. Values assumed for carbon abatement 
costs and prices are as follows:
– Carbon abatement costs: In the range of €0-45/
tCO2 with different values applying to the dif-
ferent EU countries.
– Carbon prices: In the Enhanced Policy scenario, 
the global carbon price considered is €10/tCO2. 
In the Baseline scenario, the price in ETS sec-
tors is €25/tCO2. No carbon tax or similar in-
strument is considered within non-ETS sectors.
2. Medium carbon abatement cost future: Medium 
fossil fuel prices and rates of development of clean 
technologies lead to a competitiveness gap which 
is larger than that of the previous scenario but still 
moderate. Hence, we have considered:
– Carbon abatement costs: In the range of €15-
60/tCO2 with different values applying to the 
different EU countries.
– Carbon prices: In the Enhanced Policy scenar-
io, the global carbon price considered is €25/
tCO2. In the Baseline scenario, the price in ETS 
sectors is €40/tCO2. No carbon price is applied 
in non-ETS sectors.
3. High carbon abatement cost future: Low fossil fuels 
and rate of development of clean technologies lead 
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to a large gap between the cost of high- and low-
C products. Levels of carbon abatement costs and 
carbon prices considered are:
– Carbon abatement costs: In the range of €30-
75/tCO2 with different values applying to the 
different EU countries.
– Carbon prices: In the Enhanced Policy scenar-
io, the global carbon price considered is €40/
tCO2. In the Baseline scenario, the price in ETS 
sectors is €55/tCO2. No carbon price applied in 
non-ETS sectors.
B) Types of effects considered 
Climate policies impact the public budget in two dif-
ferent ways. First, they directly impact the budget 
by creating new public revenue and expense streams 
(in the sense that they follow directly from “new” 
policies). Second, they indirectly impact the public 
budget by affecting decisions by economic agents on 
the use of resources, which has an impact on the base 
and average rates of main State taxes and expenses. 
Direct impacts of climate policy instruments on the 
public budget analyzed include revenues from carbon 
pricing and expenses associated with the develop-
ment of new clean technologies. Indirect impacts we 
consider are of two main types. First, we have chang-
es to State revenues and expenses from excise taxes 
and on-/off-budget subsidies that are associated with 
the change in the level of fossil fuel production and 
consumption triggered by climate policy. Second, the 
application of climate policies affects the level of the 
GDP, which impacts the tax base, tax rates and dif-
ferent public social expenses such as unemployment 
subsidies. 
Subsidies directly or indirectly affected by climate 
policy may be of two main types: on and off-budget. 
Off-budget subsidies (or support payments) can, in 
turn, be classified into two main types. i) the so called 
“hidden subsidies”, which are not directly affecting 
public accounts because they are afforded by consum-
ers through an increase in the tariffs they pay (and 
which from a legal perspective are not subsidies); and 
ii) those that are directly affecting State revenues and 
expenses but are not reflected in the public budget be-
cause they correspond to foregone State revenues, e.g. 
in the form of reduced tax levels. 
We have not considered the first type in our analysis, 
since they are not directly affecting State revenues and 
expenses and their indirect effect on State revenues 
through a change in consumers’ decisions is difficult 
to estimate. On the other hand, we did take into ac-
count those off-budget subsidies corresponding to re-
duced tax rates applied by States on some products or 
services directly related to the application of climate 
policy. Subsidies of this type have a clear impact on 
State revenues that can be quantified more easily than 
that of hidden subsidies. See Box 3 for a more detailed 
description of the different types of subsidies. 
C) Data input and central assumptions 
Main modeling assumptions
Strictly speaking, an accurate computation of the im-
pact of climate policy on revenues and expenses of 
EU Member States requires determining – for each 
scenario and carbon abatement cost future – the 
functioning of the economy in general and of the en-
ergy sector in particular using complex simulation 
models. This is beyond the scope of this project. Thus, 
results on main State revenue and expense streams 
computed are based on advanced back-of-the-enve-
lope computations making use of publicly available 
data. This implies that the choice of the policy sce-
narios considered has been constrained by data avail-
ability. It also implies that we have only been able to 
assess the impact of climate policies on the output of 
the economy using estimates from external analyses 
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Box 3: Different types of subsidies
There is not a common and shared definition of “sub-
sidy”. Some possible ones follow:
– “any government action that concerns primarily 
the energy sector that lowers the cost of energy 
production, raises the price received by energy pro-
ducers or lowers the price paid by energy consum-
ers” (IEA, 2006).
– “any government action designed to influence en-
ergy market outcomes, whether through financial 
incentives, regulation, research and development 
or public enterprises” (EIA, 1992).
– “a 'subsidy' exists when there is a 'financial con-
tribution' by a government or a public body that 
confers a 'benefit'. A 'financial contribution' arises 
where: (i) a government practice involves a direct 
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infu-
sion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that 
is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a govern-
ment provides goods or services other than gen-
eral infrastructure, or purchases goods; or (iv) gov-
ernment entrusts or directs a private body to carry 
out one or more of the above functions. A 'benefit' 
is conferred when the 'financial contribution' is 
provided to the recipient on terms that are more 
favorable than those that the recipient could have 
obtained from the market” (see “WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures”, Art.1).
All these definitions include not only direct financial 
transfers from the government to producers or con-
sumers, but also those services directly undertaken 
by the public sector and all those measures which 
support a certain sector or activity without explicitly 
incurring a public outlay. Furthermore, some studies 
have stated that, for the energy sector in particular, 
other types of implicit support should be taken into 
account including the limitation of civil liability for 
nuclear accidents, provided by the Paris (1960) and 
Vienna (1963) Conventions and by the Joint Protocol 
(1988), and, in general, the lack of measures impos-
ing external costs on the energy sector operators that 
could be deemed responsible for them (see e.g. EEA, 
2004). 
Government subsidies in the energy sector can be 
classified into on- and off-budget subsidies. On-
budget subsidies include those interventions that 
appear as outlays in the general government balance-
sheet. Off-budget subsidies represent cash transfers 
to industry and households that are either not identi-
fied as a subsidy in the Government’s accounts or not 
reflected in these accounts at all, even when they may 
have some economic impact on the public budget. 
This category includes tax exemptions and tax arrears, 
support payments financed through consumer tariffs 
or benefits provided through market regulation (e.g. 
reduced VAT rates for fuel products). Off-budget sub-
sidies may be financed by consumers within certain 
sectors through an uplift in the level of regulated tar-
iffs or correspond to foregone State revenues mainly 
in the form of reduced tax rates.
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of the unit social cost of the decarbonization of each 
system (carbon abatement costs).
The work in EC (2009) is the only publicly available 
one we have found simulating the functioning of the 
energy sectors of EU Member States under different 
climate policy packages. However, EC (2009) only 
considers carbon prices in the low range of those pro-
jected in other works. Therefore, we took values of 
carbon prices in EC (2009) as those corresponding to 
our low carbon abatement cost future. Based on these 
prices and information in the literature, we have esti-
mated the level of carbon abatement costs in this fu-
ture as well as abatement cost and carbon price levels 
in the two other futures considered. Specifically, dif-
ferences in carbon prices (both in ETS and non-ETS 
sectors) among futures, both in the Baseline and En-
hanced Policy scenarios, have been assumed to be of 
the same nominal value as those in abatement costs.
Due to the fact that data on fossil fuel production and 
use in each system and policy scenario are also pub-
lished only for the low-C abatement cost future, we 
have assumed the same level and distribution of the 
use and production of fossil fuels in our three futures.
Our analysis does not consider the recycling of rev-
enues and the sourcing of expenses resulting from the 
implementation of climate policy. However, we must 
make an assumption on which of the costs associated 
with climate policies will be financed from general tax 
revenues (thus directly affecting the public budget) 
and which are to be financed through surcharges in 
consumer tariffs (and therefore are not directly affect-
ing the public budget). We have assumed that climate 
policy expenditures will be financed from the same 
sources in 2020 as they are today in most systems (the 
most common option today is assumed to be adopted 
by all systems in 2020).
Once those climate policies financed through the 
public budget have been identified, we focus on the 
effect of the stand-alone application of these poli-
cies on State budgets. Considering revenue recycling 
would imply that a number of further State policies 
not related to climate or energy would have to be con-
sidered together with new climate and energy policy 
measures. Then, the overall impact on public budgets 
of all these policies would be revenue neutral, i.e. pub-
lic revenues from climate would be reinvested some-
where else in the economy, while expenses would 
have to be financed through an increase in revenues 
or debt, or a decrease in other public expenses.24 
Given that we are not discussing the sourcing of pub-
lic funds and recycling of public revenues, we cannot 
assess either the impact that the application of climate 
policies will have on the distribution of income with-
in the society. The welfare of households and firms is 
critically conditioned by the allocation of costs and 
revenues of policies.
Finally, information in EC (2009) on the expected 
functioning of the energy system in the EU countries 
in the year 2020 does not include the set of taxes on 
fossil fuels expected to be applied. Hence, we have 
regarded carbon pricing measures considered in our 
analysis as additional to taxes on fossil fuels, which 
are deemed to have the same level as those currently 
applied. In reality, taxes of different types levied on 
high-C products will probably be merged into a sin-
gle one, which may include two components, one 
related to the energy content, and another to GHG 
emissions.
24  Recycling of additional revenues can mitigate the neg-
ative impact of higher production cost due to e.g. carbon pric-
ing (see e.g. Pissarides, 2008; Cambridge Economics, 2008); the 
literature here also talks about the so called “double dividend of 
environmental taxation” (see e.g. Sandmo, 2000). The net effect 
depends on whether the welfare gain from recycling (through e.g. 
a reduction in existing distortionary taxes) exceeds the welfare 
loss from higher energy prices. 
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Data used as an input to our analysis
Values for main macroeconomic variables and pa-
rameters characterizing the energy sector in the Base-
line and Enhanced Policy scenarios for the low car-
bon abatement cost future have been obtained from 
the prospective analysis regularly published by the 
European Commission on the likely evolution of the 
energy sector under several climate policy regimes 
(EC, 2009). In this EC analysis, the partial equilib-
rium model PRIMES and the general equilibrium 
model GEM-E3 are employed to compute the equi-
librium of the energy system and the whole economy, 
respectively.
However, information published does not include 
data needed to estimate some of the main compo-
nents of State revenues and expenses. Missing infor-
mation that has been obtained from additional sourc-
es include: i) carbon abatement costs, ii) the level of 
investments required in RD&D of low-C technolo-
gies, iii) the productivity, or capital-output ratio, of 
activities being drained of funds and those being sub-
sidized through new climate policies applied; iv) elas-
ticities of State revenues and expenses with respect to 
changes in GDP; v) implicit excise tax rates applied to 
fossil fuels, and vi) on- and off-budget subsidies ap-
plied. 
Main input variables considered in our analysis and 
the sources of data we have employed are provided 
in Annex IV. Carbon abatement costs and prices con-
sidered for the medium- and high abatement cost 
futures have been provided at the beginning of this 
annex. Box 4 summarizes the analysis presented in 
EC (2009), which is our main source of information. 
It also includes a discussion of its main results that 
have had input in our study.
Box 4: External modeling of the economy under the two scenarios that our analysis is based upon
The analysis in EC (2009) has been carried out by a 
consortium led by the National Technical University 
of Athens (E3MLab). It is based on the use of model 
PRIMES to simulate the functioning of the energy sec-
tor, which has been developed by the E3MLab. Input 
data used by PRIMES have been produced with the 
help of external models, like GEM-E3 (computation 
of projections of the value added per branch of activ-
ity) and PROMETHEUS (computation of projections of 
world energy prices). Results produced in EC (2009) 
include the evolution of main variables of the energy 
sector for the EU as a whole and each of its 27 Member 
States both in the Baseline and the Enhanced Policy 
scenarios for the low carbon abatement cost future 
that we consider up to 2030. 
Description of the PRIMES and GEM-E3 models 
PRIMES is a modeling system that simulates a market 
equilibrium solution for energy supply and demand in 
the EU-27 and its individual Member States. The mod-
el determines the equilibrium by finding the prices of 
each energy form such that supply matches demand. 
The market equilibrium is computed for different time 
periods. The simulation of the functioning of the en-
ergy system is dynamic over time. The model is based 
on assumptions about the rational behavior of agents 
in the system. However, it also represents in an ex-
plicit and detailed way available energy demand and 
supply technologies and pollution abatement tech-
nologies. The modeling approach followed includes 
considerations about market economics, industry 
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structure, energy/environmental policies and regula-
tion, which may all influence the market behavior of 
energy system agents. PRIMES is structured in mod-
ules representing the distribution of decision making 
among agents that act individually regarding their 
supply, demand, combined supply and demand, and 
prices. The market module of PRIMES subsequently 
simulates market clearing. 
Macroeconomic data corresponding to the whole 
economy has been computed with GEM-E3, an ap-
plied general equilibrium model aiming at covering 
the interactions between economy, energy system 
and environment. GEM-E3 simultaneously computes 
the competitive market equilibrium under Walras’ law 
(prices are computed as a result of supply and demand 
interactions in the markets) and determines the bal-
ance for energy demand/supply and emissions/abate-
ment. The model explicitly formulates the supply and 
demand behavior of economic agents regarding pro-
duction, consumption, investment, employment and 
allocation of their financial assets.
Discussion of external modeling results
Analyses conducted in EC (2009) for both scenarios 
rely on the same macroeconomic, demographic and 
fossil fuel price assumptions. Projections of the evolu-
tion of the economy, population and fossil fuel prices 
are exogenous to the different scenarios, taking into 
account the recent economic crisis.  Economic growth 
for the past decade is set at 1.2% p.a., while the pro-
jected rate for the period 2010 to 2020 is deemed to 
be 2.2% p.a. (i.e. the EU-27 GDP increases from €10,100 
bn to €14,164 bn). Economic growth projections differ 
by Member State. Whereas countries in northern and 
central Europe are more affected by the recession and 
economic recovery is deemed to take relatively long, 
“new” Member States are expected to recover faster. 
For southern economies long-term prospects on GDP 
growth are slightly lower than the average. The Euro-
pean population is forecasted to reach 513.8M people 
in 2020 with a growth rate of 0.3% p.a. over the next 
decade. GDP per capita is expected to increase in the 
long-term at an average rate below 2% p.a. (in real 
terms). World fuel prices are projected to increase over 
the period 2010-2020 with oil prices reaching a level 
of $88/bbl in 2020 ($106/bbl in 2030). Gas prices are 
assumed to develop in line with oil prices and reach 
$62/boe in 2020 ($77/boe in 2030), and coal is expect-
ed to be traded at $26/boe in 2020 ($29/boe in 2030) 
on international markets (all in 2008 values).
Results computed for the Baseline show that EU-27 
GHG emissions would decrease by 14% with the larg-
est part of the reduction in energy-related CO
2 
emis-
sions occurring in the ETS sectors. ETS carbon prices 
drive CCS investments; power generation capacity 
equipped with carbon capture facilities increases up 
to 5.4 GW in 2020. Electricity prices increase which in 
turn result in lower consumption supporting emission 
reduction. The share of RES in gross final energy de-
mand is projected to increase to 14.8% in 2020, with a 
RES share in transport of 7.4%.
The emission allowance price in the Enhanced Policy 
scenario is lower than that in the Baseline, resulting 
from the implementation of RES support policies and 
additional legislation supporting the deployment of 
highly efficient technologies. The calculated shadow 
value for carbon emissions originating from the non-
ETS sector is lower than the ETS allowance price since 
abatement opportunities in non-ETS sectors include 
a large number of energy efficiency measures that 
are deemed to be already cost competitive by 2020. 
EU-27 GHG emissions in the Enhanced Policy scenario 
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Annex VI: Industrial Council Meeting – 
Summary discussion on robustness of 
preliminary project results 
Responsible: Serge Galant, Technofi 
Submission date: March 2011
The question 
What is the impact of the EU climate and energy poli-
cies on the public budget of each Member State?
The tentative answer
The Council agreed on climate and energy targets 
to be met by 2020 in 2007 (the so called “20-20-20 
targets”). Implementing actions to reach such tar-
gets will require national policies, which may affect 
Member State revenues and expenses. It is proposed 
to use “back-of-the-envelope” calculations in order to 
obtain orders of magnitudes for the resulting changes 
in revenues and expenses, using a combination of the 
PRIMES and GEM-E3 modelling results implement-
ed by the EC in a recent publication.25 
25  Communication from the Commission to the Europe-
an Parliament and the Council on Renewable Energy-Progress-
ing towards the 2020 target (COM (2011)31)
Clarity improvements 
The following improvements are proposed in the new 
version of the report.
– A new section is needed detailing the underly-
ing assumptions onto which the baseline and 
reference scenarios are built and compared. More 
convincing strength to the report can be brought 
by comparing the assumptions in both scenari-
os, and by recalling the working assumptions of 
PRIMES and GEM-E3, which would in turn help 
avoiding sterile debates on the sense of the figures 
presented in the report. “Back-of-the-envelope” 
should lead trends in revenue and expenss chang-
es when implementing the action plans required 
to meet EU policy objectives at national level.
– A table recalling the main answers brought by 
the “back-of-the-envelope” calculations for each 
Member State and giving a “back-of-the-enve-
lope” explanation for each Member State would 
help understanding the sense of the results (in-
cluding the specific position of the new Member 
States).
– The models allow to link fuel prices with GDP. It 
seems that no such links have been made between 
carbon pricing and GDP. Is there any chance to 
decrease by 20.3% with respect to 1990 levels. The 
emission reduction target is met internally without 
any use of CDM. Emissions decrease faster than in the 
Baseline scenario up to 2020 since both emission re-
duction and RES targets have to be met. Afterwards, 
this decrease becomes less steep resulting in a con-
vergence of the carbon intensity of the economy in 
both scenarios by 2030. However, it is the stock (and 
not the flow) of GHG what matters for climate pro-
tection and hence, the Enhanced Policy scenario is 
environmentally superior. With respect to CCS, only 
already advanced demonstration plants are realized 
until 2020 because carbon prices in this modeling ex-
ercise do not to provide strong enough investment in-
centives. Electricity prices do not change substantially 
compared to the Baseline scenario because lower al-
lowance auctioning expenditures as well as lower fuel 
and variable costs compensate for higher capital costs 
related to the larger amount of energy produced from 
RES. The share of RES in primary energy consump-
tion amounts exactly to 20% in 2020 with 10% for the 
transport sector.
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isolate a section where the role of assumptions on 
carbon prices is examined?
– A section on the feedback of the proposed an-
swers to the initial EU policies is relevant: it 
would show why and how initial EU policies and 
implementation plans should be modified in or-
der to make the decarbonisation targets more 
realistic because of the changes in revenues and 
expenses within the Member States.
Completeness improvements 
– One of the main issues raised by the intensive use 
of feed-in tariffs is the following: (i) actual feed in 
tariffs lead to extra costs of renewable electricity 
which are charged to all the consumers of elec-
tricity (almost every household in EU-27), (ii) 
another path would be to use tax payer money 
to pay for such extra costs. Both have pros and 
cons: they impact the state budget (revenues and 
expenses) differently. A section is needed to ad-
dress this issue (also called ‘hidden subsidies’).
– Further study should look into the impact of 
taxation on GDP, provided that “back-of-the-en-
velope” calculations allow extracting such influ-
ences.
– The 2020 targets are still about 10 years away from 
where this report stands. There is evidence of fuel 
prices influence on long term fuel consumption. 
Can this effect be taken into account (long term 
decrease of fuel consumption due to sharp rises 
in fuel prices), which would impact the whole set 
of criteria for which people choose or not to go 
for less carbon intensive energy resources?
– Assuming that the basic assumptions of the 
“back-of- the-envelope” calculations have been 
underlined, is it possible to give trends induced 
by changes in assumptions onto the conclusions 
of the report? (Are the present results insensi-
tive (or robust) to changes in assumptions made 
to perform the “back-of-the-envelope” calcula-
tions?)
Coherence improvements
– The role and impacts of R&D investments (and 
not “expenditures”!) might appear incoherent 
with the conclusions of the THINK report pub-
lished early 2011 on “Funding innovation about 
low carbon energy systems”.
– Assuming that the results appear robust enough, 
what are the climate and energy policy imple-
mentation consequences when looking both at 
Member State and EU-27 level?
– Carbon taxing has distributional effects: they 
should be addressed in the new version of the re-
port.
Annex VII: Comments by Project Advi-
sors – Based on a preliminary version of 
the report 
Project Advisor I: Pantelis Capros,  
Professor at NTUA – E3MLab/ICCS 
Submission date: April 2011 
The lengthy report is a very good effort to make a syn-
thesis and quantify effects from published scenarios 
by the EU. Remarks for improvement:
EU ETS auction payments apply from 2013 onwards 
(not for 2020 as stated). The use of 50% of revenues 
for climate policies support is at the discretion of MS, 
according to my understanding. There is a strange 
situation with this provision: as most EU economies 
face high public deficits, the ministry of finance has 
interest to get maximum revenues from ETS and 
so not to incite energy market players to undertake 
extensive decarbonisation (mainly in power genera-
tion); but the energy consumers (electricity buyers) 
have interest from seeing extensive decarbonisation, 
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which will increase costs incurred by power produc-
ers but will decrease auction payments; hence the op-
timal degree of decarbonisation (in power sector) is 
not the same from the perspective of public finance 
and from the perspective of electricity consumers. 
Concrete example: failure of RES deployment until 
2020 is of interesting for public finance but not inter-
esting for consumers paying electricity prices (with 
passing through auction payments). I recommend 
mentioning this paradox in the report.
Regarding carbon taxes (on non ETS), raising such 
taxes on top of other taxation (excise taxes on fuels) 
is rather rare and unlikely to take place in the future. 
The current policies mainly envisage reform of taxa-
tion structure with new rates partly or totally reflect-
ing carbon pricing. Examples are excise taxation on 
fuels, car ownership taxes, accessibility charges, etc. 
The impact on public finance is questionable as the 
reform may be revenue neutral. I propose to simplify 
the corresponding section in the report, based on 
the above.
The EU is preparing a new draft taxation directive 
with the spirit of reflecting carbon pricing in the re-
form. The report should mention it.
The section on public support to technologies is 
lengthy and a bit confusing. In my knowledge, the 
majority of cases of public support to technologies 
(mainly for RES) are neutral for public finance, be-
cause the mechanisms include cost recover from 
consumers or from suppliers. There are few cases 
with subsidies financed by public budget. I propose 
to simplify and change the emphasis (showing the 
importance of self cost-recovering mechanisms). 
An exemption to be maintained is for R&D (public 
support must continue).
The section on indirect impact on public budgets 
is written in an academic style but in a very vague 
way without visible practical outcomes. For me it is 
confusing and should be rewritten in a simpler and 
pragmatic way. I also think I missed there some of the 
main issues:
The main economy-wide effects of decarbonisation 
policies in Europe come from the substitution of 
(mainly) imported energy commodities (fossil fuels) 
by non-energy goods and services, which at a large 
extend are domestically produced. Saving energy 
means paying more for insulation and other similar 
investments and for purchasing more advanced ap-
pliances and equipment (which are more expensive 
in capital terms than ordinary technology) and sav-
ing on the fuel bill. Decarbonizing in power gen-
eration means again paying more for capital (RES, 
grids, CCS, nuclear and so on) and less for fuels. Sav-
ing on the imported energy bill and spending more 
on domestic goods and services is, ceteris paribus, 
beneficial for public revenues (more revenues from 
VAT and other indirect taxes on non-energy goods 
and services). However, substituting fossil fuels, es-
pecially substituting oil in transport (electrification, 
biofuels, etc.) is detrimental to public revenues; the 
same applies on all savings of fossil fuels. This is the 
main effect on public budget, which dominates over 
the additional revenues from VAT and taxes on non-
energy products, and so the net balance is negative 
for public budget. An interesting issue is what part 
of the missing revenues will be covered by the new 
sources of revenue, such as the EU ETS and possible 
additional carbon taxes. Another very important is-
sue is that until now the price elasticity of gasoline/
diesel and other energy products was low allowing 
public finance policies to raise high excise tax levels 
on these products and get public revenues with suf-
ficient assurance. But when de facto replacing these 
revenue sources with carbon oriented taxes and EU 
ETS, revenues are no longer assured because by defi-
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nition decarbonisation will decrease carbon inten-
sity hence will decrease public revenues. The above 
paragraph summarizes the major policy issue with 
decarbonisation and its interference with public 
budget policies. I am not sure that the report men-
tions this major and central issue.
The decarbonisation policy may have depressive ef-
fects on economic activity (and GDP). This is a con-
troversial issue. Negative effects may arise as the net 
cost of getting energy services increases (net means 
after taking into account more capital spending and 
less fuel spending), if compared to the average cost of 
energy services based on the previous model of im-
porting fossil fuels. The higher cost for energy has a 
crowding out effect on the economy, exerts pressures 
on capital and labor markets (because the decarboni-
sation is more capital and labor intensive) and may 
propagate inflationary effects which undermines 
competitiveness in foreign trade. However, with ad-
ditional considerations the negative effect on eco-
nomic activity may turn into a positive one: if the EU 
economy departs from a situation with labor markets 
having unused resources (unemployment) and capi-
tal markets having possibilities to expand (because 
of currently insufficient investment), the decarboni-
sation would have a positive Keynesian effect on the 
economy and employment; if the sectoral productivi-
ties and the technology level of equipments and ser-
vices improves as a consequence of decarbonisation 
then the economy would benefit from competitive 
advantages in the world market for such equipments 
and services (this may be non linear if the sufficiently 
wide EU market achieves high productivity gains and 
economies of scale in producing the new goods that 
will enable decarbonisation, like PVs, wind mills, 
electric cars, efficient appliances, etc.); saving on the 
imported energy bill has an additional benefit as in-
surance against future volatility of imported energy 
prices. It is advisable to mention the above in the 
session on indirect impacts on public budget stem-
ming from possible depressive effects of decarboni-
sation on GDP.
The most significant economic gain from decarboni-
sation is the avoidance of future climate change. This 
will have detrimental effects on public budget, firstly 
because of the highly depressive effects on GDP and 
activities (see Stern report) and because of the costly 
adaptation measures, which mostly will be financed 
by the public budget (new public works, protection 
measures, payments to indemnify for extreme weath-
er consequences, etc.). Of course these public budget 
losses will take place later in time, than possible losses 
for decarbonisation and climate change mitigation. 
This issue is not mentioned in the report.
On section 4.2.2 and the sub section on subsidies to 
technology deployment: I do not agree with the ap-
proach and the implicit assumption that the “subsi-
dies” are charged on public budget. Beside few ex-
ceptions, there is no cost for public budget because 
of self cost-recovery mechanisms (through electricity 
prices). The so-called subsidies are then additional 
costs to consumers, the term subsidies not being ap-
propriate.
Direct subsidies paid from public budget may exist in 
some countries, such as tax exemptions, direct capital 
subsidies (few cases), state guarantees and the recent 
CCS fund. These should be accounted for explicitly. 
The difference in generation costs cannot be inter-
preted as a subsidy, because both the feed-in tariff 
systems and the RES obligation or RES certificate sys-
tems have self cost-recovering mechanisms. I recom-
mend changing this section
I have big problems with section 4.3 (except 4.3.3) 
both regarding the methodology (MAC curves) and 
the outcome. Recommending an alternative approach 
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is out of scope of this short note. I also do not under-
stand why unemployment would decrease!
Final remark: The whole quantitative analysis was 
based on the Baseline and Reference scenarios as 
published in the EU Energy Trends to 2030 – update 
2009. The second scenario corresponds to the EU 
Climate Action and Energy Policy package, but the 
first one (the baseline) is not a good basis for com-
parisons, because it includes the full EU ETS mecha-
nism and at a lesser degree other policies. It is not a 
scenario without climate and energy policy actions. 
The baseline scenario, not including other measures 
of the Reference one such as the renewables and ad-
ditional energy efficiency measures, show high ETS 
carbon prices as the EU ETS is binding and the other 
measures do not contribute for lowering emissions. 
Project Advisor II: Christian von Hirschhausen,  
Professor at TU Berlin & DIW Berlin 
Submission date: April 2011 
As one of the scientific advisors to THINK on the re-
port „The Impact of Climate and Energy Policies on 
the Public Budget of EU Member States” I have par-
ticipated both in the experts meeting with the Indus-
trial Council as well as in the Scientific Committee. 
In the following, I summarize the issues raised live at 
these meetings.
The objective of the report is to analyse the fiscal 
impacts of climate policies in the European context, 
and to identify areas with particularly strong effects. 
There is an interesting methodology developed, that 
looks at the climate intensity of nations and sectors; 
however, the calculations upon which the results are 
then based are somewhat biased by the methodology. 
Thus, abatement costs negatively affect GDP, and the 
support to low-carbon technologies also has a nega-
tive short-term effect in the perspective of 2020. Both 
assumptions are not necessarily plausible. The report 
in its second version now contains an explanation 
why the approach was chosen! However, here, too, a 
stronger and profound argumentation would be use-
ful, including the theoretical background.
It is not totally clear on what the “Baseline” is based, 
which may be linked to the fact of the underlying 
model used (PRIMES modeling exercises and as-
sumption behind them). In particular, in the first ver-
sions of the report there was a very straight relation 
between carbon pricing, GDP, and the fiscal impact. 
This has been relaxed slightly in the V1-version, where 
it was recognized that the relation between GDP and 
carbon is subject to a host of theories on macro-eco-
nomic relations, and that the link between abatement 
and GDP is all but linear. I also appreciate the broader 
discussion of causality that entered the V1 version, 
in particular the discussion on GDP increases when 
going from “dirty” to “clean” economy (Acemoglu 
and Aghion – “green growth theory”). The authors 
are now more aware that they should consider a me-
dium- (not short-) term perspective, and arguments 
in that direction have been strengthened.
Distributional issues are addressed, though not fully 
with respect to pricing. It might have been useful to 
include a “Ramsey argument” (i.e. you should tax the 
most inelastic demand); thus, taxing through a car-
bon price could be efficient even though not fair; the 
trade-off between efficiency and fairness needs to be 
taken into account in policy, too.
The results are presented in a detailed manner, and at 
three digits specific. This overshoots the way results 
can be interpreted, since after all we are dealing with 
a “back-of-the-envelope” approach.
What can be conclusions for European policy? There 
will be winners/loosers; actually, distributional is-
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sues are one main reason why we have the EU. Car-
bon pricing is the dominant effect on state budgets, 
other – and especially indirect – effects are negligible. 
There are significant differences between the coun-
tries, in particular in the “new” Member States (e.g. 
Bulgaria and Estonia), that need to be taken into ac-
count. Overall, the finding that climate policy can be 
financed “on average” is plausible, but there is a need 
for distributive policies to maintain the political con-
sensus, e.g. a type of burden sharing agreement.
Overall, climate policies can be financed relatively 
easily, but the distributional effects need to be taken 
into account; there is a broad consensus on this re-
sult, both in the stakeholder community and in the 
academic council, and thus the report provides an 
important input to the further discussion at the EU 
and at the member level.
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